Wrestlenomics Radio - Survey Results

I put a survey up on Twitter about my Wrestlenomics podcast to look more about my audience with some anonymous feedback.

Here's a brief summary of the results:

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Q1: Do you regularly listen to the Wrestlenomics Radio podcast?

• NO - 38%
• YES - 38%
• SOMETIMES - 24%

Analysis: While I expected a survey that is mostly distributed by Twitter would include a lot of people who have never listened to my podcast, I was a little surprised the preponderance of responses was non-listeners. For that reason, I implemented a "point system" where I weighted YES/4 point, SOMETIMES/2 point, NO/1 point when looking at answers.

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Q2: What topics do you prefer Wrestlenomics Radio to cover?

Options (randomized):

Highest Scores

• Professional Wrestling Business News (financial filings, investor calls, corporate events)

High Score

• Content Distribution News (cord-cutting, int'l TV rights, future of media, journalism)
• Professional Wrestling History (legal, business, media, financial coverage)

Medium Scores

• Professional Wrestling Legal News (lawsuits, proceedings, exhibits)
• Professional Wrestling Metrics (Wrestlenomics - win/loss records, research, articles)

Low Score

• Long-form discussion of recently published articles w/ author(s)

Lowest Scores

• Guest Interviews
• Professional Wrestling Discussion (storylines, feuds, booking)
• MMA Business News (UFC/Bellator legal, business, PPV)

Analysis: I am not surprised to see that MMA business news wasn't highly ranked, and it validates my predisposition not to spend much time covering that industry. Seeing "Content Distribution News" so highly ranked is intriguing. I intrepret that subject as "looking at how the media landscape is transforming in general and the global trends we're seeing regarding how different platforms are developing". It's a subject that continues to interest me, but also something that I could spend more time immersing myself in. I was also very surprised to see "Professional Wrestling History" as highly ranked as it was. While normally a podcast would scoff at the idea of covering (in-depth) the history of WWF television deal making in the 90s, that's exactly the sort of subject matter which Wrestlenomics Radio prides itself on. It's interesting to see that "Professional Wrestling Discussion" ranked so poorly - that suggests that people are getting their fix of that topic from other podcasts. While I could certainly stand to offer my opinion more often, I am comfortable knowing that is not expected to be a major part of my show. Seeing both "Guest Interviews" and "Long-form discussions" lowly provides some interesting feedback. One comment was that I could use a steady co-host and/or show producer. I would agree with that. Overall, I'm glad that what I consider the core of my show - Professional Wrestling Business News - is still what people most expect from my show. Furthermore, as one person commented, I could continue to broaden my focus beyond just WWE to Ring of Honor, FloSlam, New Japan, TNA and other pro-wrestling companies out there.

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Q3: When is it best to release new episodes?

• Regular Rotation (i.e. twice a month) - 53%
• Immediately following big WWE Corporate events - 24%
• Whenever (surprise me!) - 23%

Analysis: I was pleasantly surprised to see that the "surprise me" contingent was larger than expected. Historically, the show appears when it's going to appear. However, the resounding feedback is that it's easier to grow and maintain an audience if you're consistent in producing content. This is hardly revolutionary thinking, but it's a worthwhile reminder that there's a lot more I could be doing around producing this sort content on a frequent and predictable basis.

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Q4: How do address audience questions?

• Email - 57%
• Twitter - 29%
• Open Lines - 12%
• None of the Above - 2%

Analysis: This is a meaningful result because it speaks to one of the major concerns that I've had in the past. Normally, I sign up for BlogTalkRadio, I schedule a show, and we're off the races. I usually have my own notes, but I allow for open lines which means I'm plugging phone numbers throughout the show even though the majority of people are going to listen to things on delay. I think considering the in-depth emails that I get which take ages to respond to, it might just be better to turn those correspondences into show topics that are addressed on air and include some element of Twitter as a medium of correspondence. I will likely be discontinuing the use of open lines. This also opens up new options for how I produce and distribute the show.

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Q5: Where do you live?

• United States - 65%
• Canada - 19% 
• United Kingdom/Ireland - 8%
• Other - 8%

Analysis: Wrestling Twitter (and F4W) does seem to have a disproportionate amount of active Europeans fans. I've received calls on my show from as far away as England and South Africa. However, the vast majority of survey respondents are North Americans. It certainly makes sense to keep show production schedules and media talk focused around the domestic marketplace that I'm familiar with. 

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Q6: Optimal Podcast Length?

• 45 minutes to 60 minutes - 39%
• However long it takes to cover the Story - 31%
• 30 minutes to 45 minutes - 15%
• 60 minutes to 90 minutes - 13%
• 90 minutes+ - 3%

Analysis: This result did surprise me. Considering the plethora of marathon wrestling podcasts out there, I expected there would be more votes for the longer 60+ timeframe. Lucky for me, that doesn't seem to be attitude of my survey respondents. That's encouraging for me because I've often felt that shows under 60 minutes are insufficient. This information really makes me rethink that attitude. Furthermore, the "cover the story" crowd makes a compelling argument that it should be the subject that dictates the length and not the other way around. I appreciate that I think I'm going to work on producing newer episodes that are under an hour. It's possible that I'm burning myself out when I do a 75 minute solo episode when it would have been a better two separate episodes. 

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Q7: Medium Preference for Wrestlenomics Radio

• Audio Podcast - 77%
• YouTube Podcast (see the hosts speaking) - 14%
• Audio-Visual Presentation (see slides/charts/financial information) - 9%

Analysis: This result pleased me. I listen to podcasts in my car while I'm driving to/from work, when I'm working in the yard, when I'm on a plane, lying in bed, taking a shower or talking a walk. I don't like to "watch" to podcasts. I don't need to see the hosts talking. I was honestly expected more people would want to see the Audio-Visual presentation (where I would incorporate slides or other data into the podcast), but I'm glad to see that most people are content to just reference this blog or other website for the numbers that are too difficult to describe over the air.

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Q8: Podcast Sponsorship 

• I skip/ignore podcast advertisers - 49%
• I have visited the website of a podcast advertiser - 44%
• I have purchased a product after I heard about them on a podcast advertisement - 6%

Analysis: I was curious if this would give me powerful ammunition to approach advertisers about the keen demographics and expansive buying power of my listening audience. It really doesn't. And that's OK. I can't say that I've ever bought a product that was being advertised on a podcast because I heard about it on the podcast. So, I'm in the 94% along with most of my listeners and non-listeners.

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Summary

This helps a lot. I have a much better vision for what I should be doing with Wrestlenomics Radio. Expect to see more episodes that are a little shorter but that are released more frequently. I will spend more time focusing on the most relevant topics and I will spend more time working on having a steady co-host and more show production. I'll also be soliciting more feedback via Twitter and email before I tape shows so I can answer audience questions. For the time being, I expect Wrestlenomics Radio to stick as a podcast. Thanks to everyone.

More feedback? Send it to @mookieghana on Twitter or email indeedwrestling@gmail.com

WWE Schedules 2008-2009, 2012-2013, 2013-2014, 2015-2016, 2017-2018

World Wrestling Entertainment usually files a lawsuit every year around WrestleMania to prevent bootleggers from selling fake WWE merchandise on the street outside of their live events. (Example from 1998.)

March 2008 to Feb 2009

March 2012 to Feb 2013

April 2013 to March 2014

April 2014 to March 2015

March 2015 to March 2016 [ Blog Post ]

March 2017 to March 2018 [ Fightful article ]

When will the WWE Network generates same profit as PPV model did?

In Wayne Duggan's article, he writes "Citi estimates WWE needs 1.76 million paid subscribers to replace the revenue the company lost when it abandoned its pay-per-view model."

I don't know if that's "the number", but that's what one expert believed.

As Dave Meltzer has noted before, it really depends on what number you're trying to hit.

Here's how I might do the math:

Last year, WWE made $180.9 million on the "Network" segment which is WWE Network + PPV. Of that $180.9m, they made $12.6m on traditional PPV. The OIBDA on the Network Segment in 2016 was $43.0 million. The OIBDA margin percentage in 2016 was 23.7%. That was down from OIBDA percentage of 30.4% in 2015 ($48.4m / $159.4m).

According to the annual report, there were several reason that the Network OIBDA % dropped in 2016 compared to 2015:

1) "In 2016, WWE incurred $13.1 million of additional programming related costs in the Network segment". The company said it was "in support of our focus on adding original programming to WWE Network and additional pay-per-view events."

2) Pay-per-view revenue (which is usually at a higher OIBDA margin) dropped from $20.6 million in 2015 (12.9% of Network revenue) to $12.6m in 2016 (7.0% of Network revenue).

3) Most importantly, there was a shift of "shared costs that WWE now allocate to the Network segment from our Television segment." That impacted the 2016 Network OIBDA by $15.4 million. (A non-trivial number!)

So, if WWE hadn't moved those shared costs, the 2016 Network OIBDA would have presumably been 32.2% which would have been higher than 2015. It's probably more accurate to look at it the other way around - the 2015 Network OIBDA should have been lower because WWE was allocating a lot of shared costs to the very profitable TV Rights segment instead of the not-so-profitable Network segment.

Should we assume that the WWE Network segment is finally carrying it's fair share and generates about 24% OIBDA? (Keep in mind that we're looking at 2016 which didn't have a full year of dual PPV events. That Network OIBDA percentage could be even lower in 2017.)

The next question is how does that compare to the PPV model? WWE used to generate between low of $70 million (2010) and high of $94 million (2006-2007) in PPV revenue. Even as late as 2012-2013, the PPV segment still generated $83 million annually.

Of course, WWE doesn't make it easy to compare total's company to the old company because they're always using different accounting measures (cost of revenues, OIBDA, adjusted OIBDA, profit contribution, EBITDA, etc.) in one period versus another period.

The "profit contribution" of the PPV revenue varied between a low of $40 million (2010) and high of $52 million (2006) during 2006-2012. The average profit contribution percentage was 54%.

We have a shorter time-period where we got PPV OIBDA. The average OIBDA for PPV was $40 million (average of 2011-2013), which would be OIBDA percentage of 48%.

(Again, this OIBDA % for PPV is probably artificially low because by 2011-2012 WWE had already investing money in what would become the WWE Network. And this included the WWE Classics on Demand/VOD service for a period.)

So, the simple comparison would be that since the PPV segment was twice as profitable as the WWE Network segment is today, they would need approximately twice as much WWE Network revenue to achieve the same PPV profitability.
That's about $165 million in WWE Network revenue if you want to replicate the profitability they achieved under the PPV model in the years prior to the WWE Network launch.

From that comparison, you could say they are about break-even (in terms of annual profit) to where they were prior to launching the WWE Network. There was 2014 where they had a OIBDA of -1.8 million on the Network segment, which means there's at least $40 million that WWE never earned because they blew up their PPV model. If you include those costs, WWE is still way behind.

How far behind? Imagine that WWE had earned $40 million OIBDA from PPV from 2014-2017. That's $160 million.
So far, 2014-2016, WWE is at $91 million OIBDA for the WWE Network segment. That leaves a $69 million gap. At current rates, that would require having annual average subscribers of 2.4 million ($289 million revenue = $69 million OIBDA). They're not going to do that.

So, how far do you stretch out the model? 5 years? 7 years? 10 years?

Let's say that this year maybe WWE will average 1.6 million paid subs. I'd guess that would generate only $46 million in OIBDA. It will take a long time to recapture that $40 million in OIBDA they gave up in 2014.

Based on what we know about PPV from UFC and Boxing, it's hard to say that we should discount the medium as dead for the big events like WrestleMania or Royal Rumble.

(Note: this ignores the other segments that were cannibalized by the WWE Network launch.)

Q&A: WWE PG? Blood? Part Timers?

Periodically, people reach out to me with Q&A.

1) Turning PG for creating viewership among kids and families seems to have overly sanitized it for the crucial 18-34 male demographic. This set seems to be losing interest and is increasingly weaned away by the bloodier options e.g. UFC. Is turning a sub-brand (Smackdown?) into a Rated show for the Male 18-34 an option? Full of the good ole blood n cuss show?

It's an interesting question and certainly a subject that comes up a lot – does the “PG” nature of the product limit WWE’s ability to continue to grow their audience?

I think it’s important to look at how WWE makes their money:

· Television Rights ($241.7 million; 33.1%) – about 49.6% OIBDA %
· WWE Network Subscriptions ($168.3 million, 23.1%) – about 23.8% OIBDA %
· Live Events and Travel Packages ($144.4 million, 19.8%) – about 28.9% OIBDA %
· Licensing ($49.1 million, 6.7%) – about 55.8% OIBDA %
· WWEShop ($34.6 million, 4.7%) – about 21.1% OIBDA %
· Digital Media ($26.9 million, 3.7%) – about 17.1% OIBDA %
· Venue Merchandise ($24.2 million, 3.3%) – about 40.5% OIBDA %
· Home Entertainment ($13.1 million, 1.8%) – about 40.5% OIBDA %
· Traditional PPV ($12.6 million, 1.7%) – about 23.8% OIBDA %
· WWE Studios ($10.1 million, 1.4%) – negative OIBDA (-2.0%)
· Corporate & Other ($4.2 million, 0.6%) - negative OIBDA (-4257.1%)

Not only is television rights their largest revenue source, it’s their most profitable revenue source ($120 million OIBDA annually). It’s twice the OIBDA % compared the WWE Network or even Live Events.

And WWE Television rights fees have contractual escalators. Regardless of the ratings or value of the advertisers, WWE is pretty much guaranteed to receive more and more money from their largest television deals (US, UK, India) through 2019. Those top three deals are likely to represent more than three-quarters of all of WWE’s television revenue and the US deal is certainly more than half the company’s total television revenue. They’re looking at nearly $20 million in incremental TV rights fees annually for the next three years.

USA Network (parent company NBC Universal) has agreed to these terms. They get the value by using WWE programming to keep their network as a top rated cable network with commands high carriage fees. They can go to advertisers to sell the eyeballs that WWE is delivering. While professional wrestling has always done well in terms of ratings and poorly in terms of advertising, since WWE has basically turned the keys over to USA, in recent years, USA has succeeded in bringing in a host of new “blue-chip” advertisers to air during WWE programming. That’s a huge win for WWE and according to their marketing and branding officers, that win came directly from selling a PG product. Advertisers were leery of man-on-woman violence and overtly sexually situations. That said, obviously, blood & sex sell plenty well on other networks.

Some of that may be because professional wrestling has historically commanded low ad rates and been associated with demographics that don’t have much income.

Look at the Sports Business Journal;s 2013 article comparing wrestling, boxing and MMA fans. WWE fans were the least educated and had the lowest household income.

WWE has changed their product because that’s what the network wanted them to do so they could better sell advertising. While it might impact WWE’s ability to attract new fans (which in turn damage their WWE Network subscription base and the Live Events business), they must see the trade-off being the ability to deliver their promised product to the Network which has guarantee the television revenue.

When you watch the WWE Business Partner Summits (something I did in 2015 and 2016), what is very obvious is how much WWE values being associated with higher-end brands and how that's been a priority for the company. This was a slide from the presentation about new advertisers that WWE had:

Regarding Smackdown, the decision to move it to the USA Network and make it live was driven by the Network. As I understand it, WWE was actually able to negotiate a bit for additional funding to off-set the added expenses of going live. And while Raw ratings have continued to slip year-over-year, Smackdown ratings are up.

Would it benefit Smackdown to be further differentiated from Raw by showcasing a different style? Absolutely. But while both shows are under the thumb of the same corporate parent, I just don't see it happening in the near future.

I do believe that for a time, WWE was able to use shows like Total Divas (and now Total Bellas) as decent tool to create more interest and awareness of WWE characters in an underserved demographics (women). And it's true that coverage of these reality shows has begun on female-centric websites like Jezebel or more mainstream websites like Buzzfeed that probably would never have happened unless WWE (again through NBC Universal) found a way to put a different product on a different channel. However, there is great argument about whether this has a cross-over effect which benefits WWE - are these people tuning in to watch Raw & Smackdown? Are they going to live events? Are they purchasing merchandise of the characters on the reality shows? Are they subscribing to the WWE Network to watch back episodes?

While the percentage of females watching Raw has actually gone up in recent years (and it's dramatically up from twenty years ago when the product has an overwhelming young male viewership), some of that is just because there has been greater attrition of men watching TV rather than an enormous growth in women viewers. I would say the "Divas Revolution" certainly has resonated with many viewers, but it's a little too simplistic to tie the entire narrative into a single bullet point in my opinion.

The idea that what fans want is "blood" is an open question. We're entering a phase where blood has been away from the screen so much, that many fans don't have any interest or desire to see it return. I know my wife can't stand it when it shows up accidentally during matches or when I'm watching old footage. But there is certainly a gritty, story-telling element to it which helps UFC connect. That said, UFC is built on stars just like WWE. When the stars are fighting, people tune in. Just like wrestling, good matches don't usually lead to good ratings. Stars leads to ratings. And likewise, UFC has increasingly seen feast or famine as the number of megastars dwindles. Bellator's ability to draw has never been predicated on having the best matches, but rather on the nostalgia of the star fighters they can reregurgitate one more time. I would also argue that UFC plays the "real sports" element in a way that WWE struggles as sports entertainment. The suspension of disbelief is simpler in a MMA fight than a pro-wrestling match. That's also why WWE likes to pretend their competition is other entertainment shows rather than other live combat events. Yet, WWE's contracts with performers and arenas have specific language about MMA written in because it's clear there is a big cross-over there both in terms of audience and in terms of talent.

2) Using part-timers. Prohibits the creation of more/enough Superstars that generate viewership. Also, part-timers keep getting top billing at PPVs and the 4 tent-pole events undermining the growth of new generation Superstars. It's a vicious cycle, then.

On one hand, WWE has an enormous number of people under contract between Raw, SmackDown and NXT. That said, the business is still struggling to create mega-stars that stick around above the pack. While everyone loves to rag on Roman Reigns, the reality is that he is selling a lot of merchandise and in some circumstances, his house show numbers are decent. Cena is still a star. And beyond that, it gets fuzzy – Owens? Orton? Rollins? AJ? They’re great wrestlers, but they don’t have that aura about them that puts them into the stratosphere like Austin or Rock or even HHH.

I did a study once in an article for Fighting Spirit Magazine about new talent joining WWE and how long before they were a “main eventer”. I didn’t qualify whether business did well or not while they main evented, but rather just how look it took them to get to that point. What I learned was that it was essentially a crapshoot – the best strategy you could have was to bring as many people up as possible in a year because on average, the same percentage of people succeeded. My conclusion was that it’s tough to pick winners & losers – you’re better letting the wisdom of the masses start to see who connects and who works. We know Vince never saw Foley as a main eventer, but he ended up being the right guy at the right time. Same thing could be said for both Daniel Bryan and CM Punk.

That all said, what makes a wrestler into bonafide draw is that specialness. And one thing that can be said for part-timers is that they often give off that vibe that what you’re seeing is not commonplace. Brock Lesnar might have a sweetheart deal but the fact that WWE (Vince, really) is willing to pay him that much (and continue to renew the deal) says something about the value they’re seeing in him. The fact UFC went out of their way to get him back, says something about him. The fact that bringing him to a house show in Chicago with Orton made the gate explode, says something about him. I can understand the dilemma about whether you can build your promotion around a guy that isn’t working house shows. They’ve done with Rock. They’ve done it with Brock. They’re doing it with Goldberg. And I do agree that some hardcore fans are turned off about it. Yet, I must admit that when Goldberg came back suddenly my facebook feed was flooded with older fans, people who haven’t watched WWE in a decade, posting on my wall – “GOLDBERG OMG!”.

Fans long for a connection with the stars of their use. Sting was the same way. George Barrios, WWE CFO & Chief Strategy Officer, tells a story that when the WWE Network launched one of the first things they noticed was the number of people searching for Sting matches. That surprised the company since he was not someone they had ever used and someone Vince didn’t have a strong interest in anymore. However, between that evidence of fan interest and the video game deal, WWE made it happen.

And that’s a big part of it, we’ve seen several of the stars which have been negotiated through the video game deals which have turned into actual WWE deals (Angle, Warrior, Goldberg, Sting).

That said, WWE has altered the structure of what they are selling. They believe they are selling a company act – not individual superstars. You’re going to WrestleMania for the weekend – not for the individual matches. Same thing is true with house shows. In addition, the WWE Network essentially evens out the drawing ability of PPVs. We don’t have peaks & valleys. Instead, the number of subscribers outside of the January-April timeframe is generally pretty flat. So, WWE feels less and less that it’s critical that they must put a certain matchup together and instead it’s just the general feeling that whatever they put up, that’s what the hardcore consumers are going to buy.

It is probably worth noting that part-time talent is not subject the drug testing policy that full-time talent is. That means that Undertaker, Goldberg and Lesnar have certain advantages that help them stay show-ready despite their advancing age.

I completely agree that WWE is sacrificing the ability to create mega stars and long-term relationships for short-term pops. Yet, they have been able to make the part time wrestlers seem special. Perhaps it’s an argument that there should be more rotation (making the brand split more important, or developing alternative territories to send talent away for awhile). As long as the bottom line keeps growing, WWE seems increasingly less concerned about the declining ratings and the stagnant environment.

What I wonder is whether we’re reaching a plateau or whether it’s the cusp of the next level. The latest real stars to join WWE have mostly been either multi-generational talent (Usos, Reigns, Charlotte) or imported and seasoned wrestlers (Nakamura, Asuka, Samoa Joe, Rollins, Ambrose, Harper). There is a very thin list of people who are genuinely NXT-trained talents (Corbin, Braun) that the performance center has produced from scratch. Maybe all of that is about to change. Maybe the lack of remaining part time stars that can still go will force WWE’s hand.

-Chris Harrington

@mookieghana

WON Most Improved (1980-2016)

Dataset: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1dGByZWBhRdvTk3AA0HdbOLcedAEPSjX26dNRCJDxaTY/edit?usp=sharing

Data: https://sites.google.com/site/chrisharrington/mookieghana-prowrestlingstatistics/wo_awards_history

• Mike Mizanin: birthdate 10/08/80 -- #1 (2008), #1 (2009), #2 (2010), #2 (2016)
• Dolph Ziggler: birthdate 07/27/80 -- #5 (2009), #3 (2010), #1 (2011), #9 (2012)
• Cody Rhodes: birthdate 06/30/85 -- #4 (2008), #2 (2009), #4 (2011), #9 (2013)
• Dustin Rhodes: birthdate 04/11/69 -- #1 (1991), #4 (1992), #8 (2009), #3 (2013)
• Buff Bagwell: birthdate 01/10/70 -- #2 (1993), #8 (1996), #3 (1997)
• The Rock: birthdate 05/02/72 -- #2 (1997), #1 (1998), #4 (2000)
• Sting: birthdate 03/20/59 -- #3 (1986), #2 (1987), #1 (1988)
• Batista: birthdate 01/18/69 -- #2 (2004), #2 (2005), #10 (2007)
• Marc Mero: birthdate 07/09/60 -- #5 (1994), #1 (1995), #5 (1996)
• John Cena: birthdate 04/23/77 -- #2 (2003), #7 (2006), #8 (2007)
• John Morrison: birthdate 10/03/79 -- #10 (2004), #2 (2006), #3 (2008)
• Steve Williams: birthdate 05/14/60 -- #1 (1985), #4 (1993), #10 (1994)
• Shelton Benjamin: birthdate 07/09/75 -- #4 (2003), #3 (2004)
• Ray Hernandez: birthdate 05/07/56 -- #4 (1983), #4 (1984)
• Michael Elgin: birthdate 12/13/86 -- #2 (2012), #6 (2015)
• Alex Wright: birthdate 05/17/75 -- #5 (1995), #7 (1997)
• Roman Reigns: birthdate 05/25/85 -- #1 (2013), #4 (2015)
• Curt Hennig: birthdate 03/28/58 -- #1 (1983), #3 (1987)
• Butch Reed: birthdate 07/11/54 -- #2 (1982), #5 (1990)
• Diamond Dallas Page: birthdate 04/05/56 -- #4 (1995), #1 (1996)
• Mitsuharu Misawa: birthdate 06/18/62 -- #3 (1984), #4 (1985)
• Bobby Lashley: birthdate 07/16/76 -- #5 (2006), #6 (2014)
• Ricochet: birthdate 10/11/88 -- #9 (2010), #3 (2011)
• Booker T: birthdate 03/01/65 -- #9 (1998), #9 (2001)
• Scott Steiner: birthdate 07/29/62 -- #2 (1989), #3 (1990)
• Go Shiozaki: birthdate 01/21/82 -- #4 (2005), #10 (2006)
• Chris Jericho: birthdate 11/09/70 -- #6 (1998), #6 (2001)
• Jeff Hardy: birthdate 08/31/77 -- #4 (1999), #6 (2007)
• Maunukea Mossman: birthdate 11/18/75 -- #4 (1997), #3 (2001)
• Brock Lesnar: birthdate 07/12/77 -- #1 (2002), #1 (2003)
• Charlotte: birthdate 04/05/86 -- #2 (2014), #8 (2016)
• Brutus Magnus: birthdate 11/06/86 -- #6 (2009), #7 (2013)
• Randy Orton: birthdate 04/01/80 -- #7 (2003), #1 (2004)
• Steve Austin: birthdate 12/18/64 -- #2 (1991), #4 (1996)
• Rick Steiner: birthdate 03/09/61 -- #1 (1986), #2 (1988)
• Bubba Ray Dudley: birthdate 07/14/71 -- #7 (2000), #5 (2012)
• Rob Van Dam: birthdate 12/18/70 -- #7 (1996), #2 (2001)
• Test: birthdate 03/17/75 -- #3 (1999), #5 (2001)
• Sasha Banks: birthdate 01/26/92 -- #3 (2014), #3 (2015)
• Austin Aries: birthdate 04/15/78 -- #8 (2004), #9 (2005)
• Shawn Michaels: birthdate 07/22/65 -- #5 (1986), #3 (1992)
• AJ Styles: birthdate 06/02/77 -- #7 (2002), #8 (2003)
• Shinjiro Otani: birthdate 07/21/72 -- #4 (1994), #10 (1996)
• Kurt Angle: birthdate 12/09/68 -- #1 (2000), #4 (2001)
• Lex Luger: birthdate 06/02/58 -- #4 (1987), #1 (1989)
• Jun Akiyama: birthdate 10/09/69 -- #5 (1993), #3 (1996)
• Takeshi Morishima: birthdate 10/15/78 -- #1 (2006), #4 (2007)
• Ken Shamrock: birthdate 02/11/64 -- #5 (1997), #4 (1998)
• Tetsuya Naito: birthdate 06/22/82 -- #6 (2011), #9 (2015)
• KENTA: birthdate 03/12/81 -- #6 (2002), #6 (2003)
• Tomohiro Ishii: birthdate 12/10/75 -- #2 (2013), #10 (2014)
• Trish Stratus: birthdate 12/18/75 -- #4 (2002), #3 (2003)
• Wade Barrett: birthdate 08/10/80 -- #8 (2010), #7 (2011)
• Zack Ryder: birthdate 05/14/85 -- #4 (2009), #5 (2011)
• Kofi Kingston: birthdate 08/14/81 -- #7 (2008), #3 (2009)
• Adam Cole: birthdate 07/05/89 -- #6 (2012), #5 (2013)
• Taka Michinoku: birthdate 10/26/73 -- #2 (1996)
• Chad Gable: birthdate 03/08/86 -- #8 (2015)
• Candice Michelle: birthdate 09/30/78 -- #5 (2007)
• D-Lo Brown: birthdate 10/22/70 -- #3 (1998)
• Chris Benoit: birthdate 05/21/67 -- #5 (1988)
• Billy Jack Haynes: birthdate 07/10/53 -- #10 (1995)
• Tracey Smothers: birthdate 09/02/62 -- #1 (1993)
• Don Kernodle: birthdate 05/02/50 -- #3 (1982)
• Paul Roma: birthdate 04/29/60 -- #4 (1990)
• Billy Kidman: birthdate 05/11/74 -- #2 (1998)
• Rush: birthdate 09/29/88 -- #3 (2012)
• Eddie Edwards: birthdate 12/30/83 -- #4 (2010)
• Bayley: birthdate 06/15/89 -- #1 (2015)
• Edge: birthdate 10/30/73 -- #2 (2002)
• Damien Sandow: birthdate 08/03/82 -- #4 (2012)
• El Samurai: birthdate 04/19/66 -- #1 (1992)
• Yamato: birthdate 09/10/81 -- #6 (2008)
• Elix Skipper: birthdate 12/15/67 -- #9 (2003)
• Naoki Sano: birthdate 02/02/65 -- #4 (1989)
• Erick Rowan: birthdate 11/28/81 -- #4 (2014)
• Rhett Titus: birthdate 09/15/87 -- #10 (2008)
• Ethan Carter Iii: birthdate 03/18/83 -- #9 (2014)
• Al Snow: birthdate 07/18/63 -- #9 (1994)
• Finn Balor: birthdate 07/25/81 -- #9 (2009)
• Sandman: birthdate 06/13/63 -- #7 (1995)
• Frankie Kazarian: birthdate 08/04/77 -- #10 (2012)
• Chris Harris: birthdate 12/25/73 -- #10 (2003)
• Genichiro Tenryu: birthdate 02/02/50 -- #2 (1985)
• Cima: birthdate 11/15/77 -- #8 (2000)
• Black Tiger: birthdate 10/20/70 -- #7 (2001)
• Tatsuhito Takaiwa: birthdate 07/05/72 -- #1 (1997)
• Halloween: birthdate 05/22/71 -- #9 (1996)
• Titus O’Neil: birthdate 04/29/77 -- #8 (2012)
• Hayabusa: birthdate 11/29/68 -- #6 (1995)
• Umaga: birthdate 03/28/73 -- #7 (2007)
• Hector Garza: birthdate 06/12/69 -- #8 (1995)
• Yuji Nagata: birthdate 04/24/68 -- #6 (1996)
• Hernandez: birthdate 02/11/73 -- #8 (2006)
• Moose: birthdate 04/23/84 -- #2 (2015)
• Hirooki Goto: birthdate 06/25/79 -- #9 (2007)
• Nikki Bella: birthdate 11/21/83 -- #10 (2015)
• Hiroshi Tanahashi: birthdate 11/13/76 -- #4 (2004)
• Cedric Alexander: birthdate 08/16/89 -- #8 (2014)
• Jack Swagger: birthdate 03/24/82 -- #10 (2010)
• Rick Rude: birthdate 12/07/58 -- #3 (1989)
• Jack Victory: birthdate unknown -- #4 (1986)
• Charlie Haas: birthdate 03/27/72 -- #5 (2003)
• Jamie Noble: birthdate 12/23/76 -- #7 (2005)
• R-Truth: birthdate 01/19/72 -- #8 (2002)
• Jason Jordan: birthdate 09/28/88 -- #7 (2015)
• Samoa Joe: birthdate 03/17/79 -- #5 (2004)
• Jay Briscoe: birthdate 01/25/84 -- #4 (2006)
• Satoshi Kojima: birthdate 09/14/70 -- #5 (1998)
• Jeff Cobb: birthdate 07/11/82 -- #10 (2016)
• Seth Rollins: birthdate 05/28/86 -- #2 (2008)
• Bob Holly: birthdate 01/29/63 -- #5 (1999)
• Chris Hero: birthdate 12/24/79 -- #7 (2009)
• Jim Duggan: birthdate 01/14/54 -- #1 (1982)
• Christian: birthdate 11/30/73 -- #10 (2000)
• Jimmy Rave: birthdate 12/08/82 -- #5 (2005)
• Biff Wellington: birthdate 04/18/65 -- #3 (1988)
• Bobby Fish: birthdate 10/27/76 -- #5 (2010)
• Colt Cabana: birthdate 05/06/80 -- #6 (2005)
• Alberto Del Rio: birthdate 05/25/77 -- #6 (2010)
• Terry Allen: birthdate 06/11/59 -- #3 (1983)
• John Tatum: birthdate 10/21/59 -- #2 (1986)
• Dan Kroffat: birthdate 09/16/61 -- #5 (1989)
• Juice Robinson: birthdate 04/10/89 -- #3 (2016)
• Daniel Bryan: birthdate 05/22/81 -- #10 (2001)
• Alex Shelley: birthdate 05/23/83 -- #8 (2005)
• Davey Boy Smith Jr: birthdate 08/02/85 -- #6 (2013)
• Justin Credible: birthdate 10/16/73 -- #7 (1998)
• Delirious: birthdate 12/19/80 -- #6 (2006)
• Juventud Guerrera: birthdate 11/23/74 -- #3 (1995)
• Yoshihiro Tajiri: birthdate 09/29/70 -- #8 (1997)
• Kane: birthdate 04/26/67 -- #2 (1999)
• Zeus: birthdate 01/27/82 -- #5 (2016)
• Karl Anderson: birthdate 01/18/80 -- #7 (2012)
• Monty Brown: birthdate 04/13/70 -- #9 (2004)
• Katsuhiko Nakajima: birthdate 03/11/88 -- #3 (2005)
• MVP: birthdate 10/28/73 -- #1 (2007)
• Kazuchika Okada: birthdate 11/08/87 -- #1 (2012)
• Nigel Mcguiness: birthdate 01/23/76 -- #3 (2006)
• Keiji Muto: birthdate 12/23/62 -- #1 (2001)
• Nwo Sting: birthdate 08/14/62 -- #10 (1997)
• Bradshaw: birthdate 11/29/66 -- #6 (2004)
• Carlito: birthdate 02/21/79 -- #10 (2005)
• Kendo Ka Shin: birthdate 08/05/68 -- #8 (1998)
• Ray Traylor: birthdate 05/02/63 -- #1 (1987)
• Kenny King: birthdate 07/22/81 -- #10 (2009)
• Rhyno: birthdate 10/07/75 -- #8 (2001)
• Kenny Omega: birthdate 10/16/83 -- #7 (2016)
• Cesaro: birthdate 12/27/80 -- #2 (2007)
• Braun Strowman: birthdate 09/06/83 -- #9 (2016)
• Road Warrior Animal: birthdate 09/12/60 -- #3 (1985)
• Kenta Kobashi: birthdate 03/27/67 -- #1 (1990)
• Roderick Strong: birthdate 07/26/83 -- #1 (2005)
• Kerry Von Erich: birthdate 02/03/60 -- #2 (1984)
• Ron Simmons: birthdate 05/15/58 -- #2 (1990)
• Kevin Nash: birthdate 07/09/59 -- #1 (1994)
• Rusev: birthdate 12/25/85 -- #1 (2014)
• Brett Sawyer: birthdate 08/10/60 -- #2 (1983)
• Sabu: birthdate 12/12/64 -- #3 (1993)
• King Kong Bundy: birthdate 11/07/57 -- #5 (1982)
• Samson Fuyuki: birthdate 05/11/60 -- #4 (1988)
• Brian Christopher: birthdate 01/10/72 -- #2 (1992)
• Chris Adams: birthdate 02/10/55 -- #5 (1983)
• Koji Kanemoto: birthdate 10/31/66 -- #6 (1997)
• Scott Hall: birthdate 10/20/58 -- #6 (1994)
• Konnan: birthdate 01/06/64 -- #8 (1994)
• Seiya Sanada: birthdate 01/28/88 -- #8 (2011)
• Kuniako Kobayashi: birthdate 01/11/56 -- #5 (1985)
• Shane Douglas: birthdate 11/21/64 -- #2 (1994)
• Adrian Adonis : birthdate 09/15/54 -- #1 (1981)
• Sheamus: birthdate 01/28/78 -- #1 (2010)
• Kyle O'Reilly: birthdate 03/01/87 -- #10 (2011)
• Shingo Takagi: birthdate 11/21/82 -- #8 (2008)
• Kyoko Inoue: birthdate 04/22/69 -- #5 (1991)
• Shinsuke Nakamura: birthdate 02/24/80 -- #7 (2004)
• Lance Archer: birthdate 02/28/77 -- #4 (2013)
• Steve Corino: birthdate 05/29/73 -- #5 (2000)
• Larry Zbyszko : birthdate 12/05/51 -- #1 (1980)
• Stevie Richards: birthdate 10/09/71 -- #9 (1995)
• Latin Lover: birthdate 10/25/67 -- #7 (1994)
• Suwama: birthdate 11/23/76 -- #5 (2008)
• Alexa Bliss: birthdate 08/09/91 -- #4 (2016)
• Takao Omori: birthdate 10/16/69 -- #3 (2000)
• Low Ki: birthdate 09/06/79 -- #5 (2002)
• Tama Tonga: birthdate 10/15/82 -- #9 (2011)
• Luke Harper: birthdate 12/16/79 -- #5 (2014)
• Ted Dibiase Jr: birthdate 11/08/82 -- #9 (2008)
• Manabu Nakanishi: birthdate 01/22/67 -- #9 (2002)
• Big E Langston: birthdate 03/01/86 -- #8 (2013)
• Art Barr: birthdate 10/08/66 -- #3 (1994)
• The Cobra: birthdate 06/23/58 -- #1 (1984)
• Mariko Yoshida: birthdate 02/15/70 -- #5 (1992)
• Tiffany: birthdate 12/28/85 -- #10 (2013)
• Mark Briscoe: birthdate 01/18/85 -- #9 (2006)
• Tomoaki Honma: birthdate 11/18/76 -- #7 (2014)
• Mark Henry: birthdate 06/12/71 -- #2 (2011)
• Tonga Kid: birthdate 10/11/65 -- #5 (1984)
• Masaharu Funaki: birthdate 03/13/69 -- #5 (1987)
• Triple H: birthdate 07/27/69 -- #2 (2000)
• Matt Hardy: birthdate 09/23/74 -- #10 (2002)
• Tyson Tomko: birthdate 03/23/76 -- #3 (2007)
• Matt Riddle: birthdate 01/14/86 -- #1 (2016)
• Vader: birthdate 05/14/55 -- #1 (1999)
• Akira Tozawa: birthdate 07/22/85 -- #7 (2010)
• William Regal: birthdate 05/10/68 -- #9 (2000)
• Baron Corbin: birthdate 09/13/84 -- #5 (2015)
• Yoshi-Hashi: birthdate 05/25/82 -- #6 (2016)
• Michiko Omukai: birthdate 05/30/75 -- #10 (1998)
• Yoshihiro Takayama: birthdate 09/19/66 -- #3 (2002)
• Mick Foley: birthdate 06/07/65 -- #3 (1991)
• Billy Black: birthdate 04/09/57 -- #4 (1991)
• Buzz Sawyer: birthdate 06/14/59 -- #4 (1982)
• Disco Inferno: birthdate 11/12/68 -- #8 (1997)
• Mikey Whipwreck: birthdate 06/04/73 -- #2 (1995)
• Kid Kash: birthdate 07/31/69 -- #6 (2000)

WWE 2016 Results - Data

90 Minutes of Wrestlenomics Radio talking through the results!
Host Chris Harrington w/ Fightful.com's Brandon Howard.

WWE 2016 Results

Prediction is operating income of 70M / OIBDA of $100M for 2017

PPVs

· 2016: $12.6M / = 858,310 Buys?
· 2015: $20.6M / = 1,403,000 buys = $14.68 ASP
· 2014: $45.2M / = 2,292,000 buys = $19.72 ASP
· 2013: $82.5M / $34.1M OIBDA (41%) = 3,858,000 buys = $21.38 ASP
· 2012: $83.6M / $46.0M Profit Contribution = 4,023,000 buys = $20.78 ASP
· 2011: $78.3M / $40.7M Profit Contribution = 3,842,100 buys = $20.38 ASP
· 2010: $70.2M / $39.8M Profit Contribution = 3,631,100 buys = $19.33 ASP

Another drop of $8m in PPV this year.

WWE Network
· 2016: $168.3m
· 2015: $138.8m
· 2014: $69.5m

Competition include subscription digital services from Amazon, CBS, ESPN, HBO, MLB, Hulu, Netflix, NFL Network, Nickelodeon, Showtime, YouTube and many others. WWE Network now has 4x hours (7,000 hours) compared to Feb 2014 launch.

Network Segment (PPV+VOD+WWE NETWORK)
· 2016: $180.9m / OIBDA: $43.0M (23.7% OIBDA) = 32.3% OIBDA if you exclude 15.4m cost
· 2015: $159.4m / OIBDA: $49.5M (31.0% OIBDA)
· 2014: $115.0m / OIBDA: -$1.8M (n/a OIBDA %)
· 2013: $86.3m / OIBDA: $27.9M (32.3% OIBDA)
· 2012: $87.7m / OIBDA: $41.3M (47.1% OIBDA)

Network segment took on $15.4m of “Certain shared costs and expenses between Network and TV segments” in 2016.

Television Rights
· 2016: 241.7m / OIBDA: 119.8m (49.5%) = 43% OIBDA if you include 15.4m cost
· 2015: 231.1m / OIBDA: 96.7m (41.8%)
· 2014: 176.6m / OIBDA: 61.9m (35.1%)
· 2013: 163.4m / OIBDA: 56.1m (34.3%)
· 2012: 140.9m / OIBDA: 51.6m (36.6%)
· 2011: 132.6m / OIBDA: 53.2m (40.1%)


We received $17.7 million in non-film related incentives associated with television production activities in 2016, as compared to $6.3 million in 2015. During the year ending December 31, 2017, we anticipate receiving approximately $5 million to $15 million on non-film related incentives.

During 2016, the Company spent $28.0 million to produce non-live event programming for television (Total Divas Season 6, Total Bellas and Total Divas Season 5, and various non-live event programs for WWE Network, including Holy Foley, Camp WWE and Swerved Season 2).

During 2015, the Company spent $36.2 million spent on comparable programming in 2015.

We anticipate spending approximately $10 million to $25 million to produce additional non-live event content during the year ending December 31, 2017.

Home Entertainment
 2016: 13.1 / OIBDA: 5.3m ( 40.4%)
2015: 13.4 / OIBDA: 4.6m ( 34.3%)
2014: 27.3 / OIBDA: 15.0m ( 54.9%)
2013: 24.3/ OIBDA: 8.8m ( 36.2%)
2012: 33.0 / OIBDA: 15.4m ( 46.7%)
2011: 30.4 / OIBDA: 13.7m (45.1%)

2016: released 24 new home video productions domestically and, in the U.S., shipped 1.6 million DVD and Blu-Ray units, including catalog titles released in prior years.
2015: released 28 new home video productions domestically and, in the U.S., shipped 2.1 million DVD and Blu-Ray units shipped in the U.S
Home Entertainment which include revenues generated from the sale of WWE produced content via home entertainment platforms such as DVD and Blu-Ray discs and digital downloads

Digital Media
2016: $26.9 / OIBDA: 4.6m (17%)
2015: $21.5 / OIBDA: 4.4m (20.4%)
2014: $18.2 / OIBDA w/ magazines: 0.3m [2.7 magazine publishing]
2013: $23.0 / OIBDA: 5.5m (23.9%) [5.7 magazine publishing]
2012: $19.7 / OIBDA: 8.2m (41.6%) [6.0 magazine publishing]
2011: $12.5 / OIBDA: 5.3m (42.4%) [7.7m magazine publishing]

The Company receives advertising revenues from YouTube and Facebook based on viewership of our content.
Previously the Company's pay-per-view webcasts via WWE.com The role of social media by fans and by us is an increasingly important factor in our brand perception.

4.9m of the increase in 2016 Digital Media came from YouTube. Spend increase of 3.2m for increased staff related and professional services costs to support various technology initiatives.


Live Events (including travel packages)
· 2016: 141.4m / 280 dom events + 64 intl events / 189 NXT events OIBDA: 40.1m (28.4%)
· 2015: 122.4m / 273 dom events + 56 intl events / 120 NXT events OIBDA: 36.1m (29.5%)
· 2014: 108.5m / 264 dom events + 54 intl events / OIBDA 27.0m (24.9%)
· 2013: 111.5m / 256 dom events + 65 intl events / OIBDA 30.1m (27.0%)
· 2012:103.7m / 248 dom events + 66 intl events / OIBDA 26.4m (25.4%)
· 2011: 104.7m / 241 dom events + 80 intl events / OIBDA 26.7m (25.5%)

2016: 189 NXT events = 187,800 paid att. ($37.26 avg ticket) = 994/show ($37k) = $7.0m in revenue
2015: 120 NXT events = 92,500 paid att. ($36.71 avg ticket) = 771/show ($28k) = $3.4m in revenue

Venue Merchandise
 · 2016: 24.2m / 9.8m OIBDA (40.5%) = $70k/show
· 2015: 22.4m / 8.9m OIBDA (39.7%) = $68k/show
· 2014: 19.3m / 7.7m OIBDA (39.8%) = $61k/show
· 2013: 19.4m / 7.5m OIBDA (38.7%) =$59k/show
· 2012: 18.8m / 6.7m OIBDA (35.6%) = $60k/show
· 2011: 18.3m / 7.3m OIBDA (39.8%) = $57k/show

Licensing
2016: 49.1m / 27.4m OIBDA (55.8%)
2015: 48.9m / 28.8m OIBDA (58.9%)
2014: 38.6m / 21.0m OIBDA (54.4%)
2013: 43.6m / 31.1m OIBDA (71.3%)
2012: 46.3m / 32.3m OIBDA (69.7%)
2011: 54.4m / 37.0m OIBDA (68.0%)

The OIBDA margin in the 2013 reflected a $2.0m benefit associated with the recognition of the advance received from THQ. Bankrupcy of THQ and transfer of video game license to Take-Two Interactive on 2014.

The decrease in Licensing OIBDA as a percentage of revenues in 2016 as compared to 2015 was primarily due to increased talent participation expenses driven by product mix.

WWEShop
2016: 34.6m / 771,500 orders ($45) / $7.3m OIBDA 21.0% OIBDA
2015: 27.1m / 590,000 orders ($46) / $5.1m OIBDA 18.9% OIBDA
2014: 20.2m / 426,000 orders ($47) / $3.5m OIBDA 17.3% OIBDA
2013: 15.5m / 320,000 orders ($48) / $2.4m OIBDA 15.5% OIBDA
2012: 14.8m / 307,000 orders ($48) / $2.1m OIBDA 14.2% OIBDA
2011: 15.6m / 330,000 orders ($47) / $1.8m OIBDA 11.5% OIBDA

Added Amazon UK for European customers in 2014
Orders increased primarily due to the impact of additional distribution channels, including in international territories, continued marketing efforts and a broader assortment of products offered. The increase in WWEShop OIBDA as a percentage of revenues in 2016 as compared to 2015 was due to leveraging our fixed costs and improved fulfillment processes.

WWEStudios
· 2016: 10.1m / -0.2m OIBDA [includes 3.0m from 2015 films]
· 2015: 7.1m / -1.5m OIBDA [includes 2.5m from 2014 films]
· 2014: 10.9m / 0.5m OIBDA [includes 3.8m from The Call released in 2013]
· 2013: 10.8m / -12.7m OIBDA
· 2012: 7.9m / -5.5m OIBDA
· 2011: 20.9m / -29.4m OIBDA

WWE released five films in 2016 (four on DVD):
· Countdown
· Scooby Doo! & WWE: Curse of the Speed Demon
· Interrogation
· Eliminators
· Incarnate (theatrical)
We have substantial capitalized film costs.
During 2016, the Company spent $6.6 million on feature film production activities, compared to $3.8 million in 2015. In 2016, we received $1.0 million in incentives related to feature film productions, as compared to $2.4 million in 2015. We anticipate spending between $10 million and $35 million on feature film production during the year ending December 31, 2017.

During the years ended December 31, 2016, 2015 and 2014, we recorded aggregate impairment charges of $0.8 million, $0.5 million, and $1.5 million, respectively, related to several of our feature films.

As of December 31, 2016, we had $27.1 million (net of accumulated amortization and impairment charges) in capitalized film production costs, which includes 32 released films, six films completed but not yet released, three films in production, and one film in development. No assurance can be given that additional unfavorable changes to revenue and cost estimates will not occur, which, in turn, may result in additional impairment charges that might materially affect our results of operations and financial condition.
We currently record revenues from our licensed products and WWE Studios film distribution revenues after receiving statements from the licensee and/or film distributor. Under the new revenue recognition rules, revenues will be recorded based on best estimates available in the period of sales or usage.

Corporate & Other
· 2016: -178.7m OIBDA (4.2m Rev) = 24.5% of Revenue
· 2015: -172.1m OIBDA (3.2m Rev) = 26.1% of Revenue
· 2014: -151.4m OIBDA (3.0m Rev) = 27.9% of Revenue
· 2013: -127.3m OIBDA (2.9m Rev) = 25.1% of Revenue
· 2012: -116.4m OIBDA (2.3m Rev) = 24.0% of Revenue
· 2011: -103.4m OIBDA (2.4m Rev) = 21.4% of REvenue

Corporate and Other expenses increased by $14.7 million, or 9%, in 2016 as compared to 2015. This increase is primarily due to increases in professional fees of $4.7 million in support of company-wide strategic initiatives, staff related costs of $3.7 million due to increased headcount, talent related costs of $2.6 million in support of talent development and investments of $1.6 million in global branding.

International Breakout

Cultural norms and regulatory frameworks vary in the markets in which we operate and our products' nonconformance to local norms or applicable law, regulations or licensing requirements could interrupt our operations or affect our sales, viewership and success in the markets.

Talent
Approximately 185 Superstars under exclusive contracts.. highly trained and motivated independent contractors.
Our NXT division, which continues to grow in popularity, features developmental talent training to become WWE Superstars. NXT has produced approximately 90% of our current active main roster stars, such as Kevin Owens, Charlotte Flair, American Alpha, Alexa Bliss, and Sami Zayn. NXT has now evolved into our third brand after Raw and SmackDown and has transitioned into a global touring brand broadcasting live specials on WWE Network throughout the year. In 2016, we focused on recruiting international talent, resulting in approximately 40% of our developmental talent coming from outside the U.S., including China, Japan, Australia, Ireland, Scotland and Poland.

Competition
While we believe that we have a loyal fan base, the entertainment industry is highly competitive and subject to fluctuations in popularity, which are not easy to predict. For our live, television, WWE Network, pay-per-view and movie audiences, we face competition from professional and college sports, other live, filmed, televised and streamed entertainment, and other leisure activities. We compete with entertainment companies, professional and college sports leagues and other makers of branded apparel and merchandise.

The demand for entertainment and leisure activities tends to be highly sensitive to the level of consumers’ disposable income.

Investments
During the year ended December 31, 2016, we invested $1,000,000 in a fantasy sports content provider, $1,000,000 in a subscription-based sports media company and $250,000 in a virtual reality platform operator. During the year ended December 31, 2015, we invested $515,000 in a live event touring business and $400,000 in Series F Preferred Stock of a software application developer.

Risks

We could incur substantial liability in the event of accidents or injuries occurring during our physically demanding events.
 
We hold numerous live events each year. This schedule exposes our performers and our employees who are involved in the production of those events to the risk of travel and performance-related accidents, the consequences of which are not fully covered by insurance. The physical nature of our events exposes our performers to the risk of serious injury or death. Although our performers, as independent contractors, are responsible for maintaining their own health, disability and life insurance, we self-insure medical costs for our performers for injuries that they incur while performing. We also self-insure a substantial portion of any other liability that we could incur relating to such injuries. Liability to us resulting from any death or serious injury sustained by one of our performers while performing, to the extent not covered by our insurance, could adversely affect our business, financial condition and operating results. As noted below, we are the defendant in litigation claiming that professional wrestling as currently and historically performed by us has resulted in significant injuries to our performers including, but not limited to, chronic traumatic encephalopathy or "CTE". 

We could incur substantial liabilities if litigation is resolved unfavorably.
The Company has been named as a defendant in lawsuits alleging, among other things, that performers received traumatic brain injuries while performing for the Company and may have CTE. One such suit also alleges that the Company misclassified its talent as independent contractors rather than employees. The Company strongly disputes the merit of this type of case and moved to dismiss the lawsuits, which were consolidated for most purposes. Several of the claims have been dismissed, and the Company has moved to dismiss or for summary judgment on all remaining claims. If our current dispositive motions are not granted, or if any dismissals are reversed on appeal (once an appeal can be taken), the Company plans to continue to defend itself vigorously (including, if necessary, opposing class certification in the two cases filed as putative class actions). The Company’s insurance coverage for these cases is unclear. The Company has also been named in a suit that alleges class action status and alleges claims for breach of contract, among other things, relating to WWE’s alleged failure to pay royalties for streaming video on WWE Network. The Company believes all these claims are without merit and intends to continue to defend itself vigorously. In the ordinary course of business we become subject to various other complaints and litigation matters.

By its nature, the outcome of litigation is difficult to assess and quantify, and its continuing defense is costly. Any adverse judgment or settlement could have a material adverse impact on our financial condition or results of operations.

Servicing our debt will require a significant amount of cash, and we could have insufficient cash flow from operations or lack of access to sources of financing to meet these obligations and/or our other liquidity needs.

Our total consolidated debt, including the $200.0 million aggregate principal amount of 3.375% convertible senior notes due 2023 that the Company issued in a private offering in December 2016 (the "Notes"), is significant. In January 2017, pursuant to the exercise of an over-allotment option, an additional $15.0 million aggregate principal amount of the Notes was issued. We also have availability under our $100.0 million revolving credit facility (the "Revolving Credit Facility"). Through certain of our subsidiaries, the Company also has in place a films financing credit facility secured by certain of our films, a term loan secured by the Company’s jet and a real estate mortgage in the principal amount of $23.0 million secured by the related real estate (the “Asset-Backed Facilities”).

We believe we have sufficient liquidity for at least the next twelve months for our needs (including the payment of our dividend). However, our ability to make scheduled principal and interest payments on the Notes and under the Revolving Credit Facility, the Asset-Backed Facilities and any other indebtedness that may be outstanding at the time will depend on our future performance, which is subject to economic, financial, competitive and other factors beyond our control, including the items described elsewhere in these Risk Factors. Our business may not continue to generate cash flow from operations in the future sufficient to service our debt and provide for all our other uses of cash including capital and operating expenditures and paying our dividend. If we are unable to generate sufficient cash flow, we could be required to adopt one or more alternatives which, assuming they are, in fact, available, could be onerous, dilutive or otherwise affect our operations and/or the market price of our Common Stock. Such alternatives could include, for example, substantially reducing our cost structure, selling assets, reducing or eliminating our dividend, obtaining additional equity capital and/or refinancing/replacing the indebtedness. We may not be able to engage in any of these activities on desirable terms or at all due to our then existing financial condition, market conditions, regulatory matters or contractual obligations (including, for example, any restrictions under our Revolving Credit Facility or other credit agreement or debt instruments that may exist at that time). Any failure to make a required payment under our indebtedness may constitute a default under that indebtedness and under other indebtedness due to cross-default provisions and could trigger acceleration clauses causing the obligations to become immediately due and payable. The occurrence of one or more of these risks could materially and adversely affect our financial condition and operating results.

Class B Shares
There were 7,725 holders of record of Class A common stock and three holders of record of Class B common stock on February 7, 2017. Vincent K. McMahon, Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer, controls a substantial majority of the voting power of the issued and outstanding shares of our common stock, and as a result, can effectively exercise control over our affairs.

@mookieghana