NJPW Business (1999-2013)

INTRODUCTION
A short time ago I tried to look at drawing power in New Japan Pro Wrestling Business 2008-2013.  It didn't go well because I wasn't comprehensive in which shows were included and many large events were inadvertently left out. It was a flawed process.

So, I started fresh harvesting results from Purolove covering January 1999 to September 2013.

NJPW Statistics (win/loss, tag) are available on my website but now it's time to dig deeper and look at which wrestlers on top correspond to business trends. (Unfortunately, the full dataset for NJPW was limited to 1999; Pro Wrestling History does have detailed NJPW Dome & Hall History but for the moment, I'll just limit the information to what was available at Purolove.)

ATTENDANCE
As for attendance, I used the numbers provided on Purolove. These may be worked numbers, but even the relative size of each of the buildings used to run the cards year after year provides at least one indication of the relative strength of the promotion.

Shows were categorized by size:

CLASS A -- Above 20,000 people.
CLASS B -- Between 10,000 and 19,999 people.
CLASS C -- Between 7,500 and 9,999 people
CLASS D -- Between 5,000 and 7,499 people
CLASS E -- Between 3,300 to 9,999 people
CLASS F -- Between 2,000 and 3,299 people
CLASS G -- Between 1,000 and 1,999 people
CLASS H -- Between 500 and 999 people
CLASS I --  Less than 500 people

This looks at both attendance by size of shows by year and also the core annual attendance.
Joint promotion shows (with AJPW, NOAH) have been removed.
Please note that the 2013 number only represents 9 months (January through September).

Both from an absolute attendance (including the largest shows class A/B) and from a core attendance (only looking at shows that drew between 1,000 and 10,000 - class C through class G), there are three noticeably periods:

1999-2001 (stronger period, flat trend), 2002-2005 (business was declining), 2006-2012 (new normal, flatten out at lower levels than 1999-2005).  Trends for 2013 were edging upwards, possibly indicating the start of new era.

MEASURING TOP STARS
It's always complicated trying to measure who was "on top" during any era.

One metric that was used was "place on card".  This was expressed as a percentage.  On a ten match card, the first match would be consider 10% and the last match would be 100%.  (In all cards the final match was 100%.)

To validate this, I looked the average "place on card" for IWGP Titleholders.

• The place on card" metric for IWGP Heavyweight Titleholder was pretty steady with an average of 93% (with minimum in the 2006-2007 era at 87%-88% and maximum during 2011 with 97%.)
• The average "place on card" metric for IWGP Tag Team titleholders was 79% with a noted decline (average was 87% from 1999 to 2003, 79% for 2006-2009 and 65% from 2010 to 2013)
• The average "place on card" metric for IWGP IC Titleholder was 83% (2011: 72%, 2012: 88%, 2013: 82%); with only three years of history, conclusions are limited.
• The average "place on card" metric for IWGP Jr. Heavyweight titleholder was 56% (52% for 1999-2003, 62% for 2004-2006, 53% for 2007-2010 and above 70% for 2011 and 2013).
• The average "place on card" metric for the IWGP Jr. Heavyweight Tag Team titleholders was 52% (47% for 1999-2001, 55% for 2002-2006, 58% for 2008-2011, below 50% for 2012-2013)

In general, a match with any IWGP titleholder included is 73% on the card as compared to 52% for a match with no IWGP titleholders.

Wrestlers above 75% "Place on Card" metric with 30+ matches per year

(and wrestlers holding & involved in 50+ matches with IWGP Title holders)

1999 

Keiji Muto (131 matches, 92%)

Kensuke Sasaki (135 matches, 89%)

Masahiro Chono (119 matches, 89%)

Super J (95 matches, 88%)

Satoshi Kojima (137 matches, 86%)

Shinya Hashimoto (42 matches, 85%)

Hiroyoshi Tenzan (138 matches, 85%)

AKIRA (33 matches, 85%)

Don Frye (41 matches, 84%)

Scott Norton (44 matches, 84%)

Manabu Nakanishi (140 matches, 81%)

Tatsumi Fujinami (76 matches, 79%)

Yuji Nagata (135 matches, 79%)

Michael Wallstreet (67 matches, 79%)

Shiro Koshinaka (139 matches, 79%)

Meng (44 matches, 77%)

1999 Others not included

Jushin Thunder Liger (103 title-related matches, 50%)

Shinjiro Otani (94 title-related matches, 44%)

Koji Kanemoto (92 title-related matches, 48%)

Kendo Kashin (61 title-related matches, 45%)

El Samurai (51 title-related matches, 48%)

Tatsuhito Takaiwa (51 title-related matches, 46%)

Dr Wagner Jr (50 title-related matches, 46%)

Hiro Saito (46 title-related matches, 90%)

Tadao Yasuda (41 title-related matches, 82%)

2000

Masahiro Chono (127 matches, 94%)

Kensuke Sasaki (128 matches, 92%)

Manabu Nakanishi (130 matches, 87%)

Yuji Nagata (131 matches, 87%)

Scott Norton (66 matches, 86%)

Hiroyoshi Tenzan (128 matches, 85%)

Satoshi Kojima (127 matches, 84%)

Don Frye (48 matches, 84%)

Takashi Iizuka (125 matches, 80%)

Super J (56 matches, 79%)

Tatsutoshi Goto (105 matches, 78%)

Yutaka Yoshie (93 matches, 78%)

Michiyoshi Ohara (93 matches, 75%)

2000 Others Not Included

Jushin Thunder Liger (104 title-related matches, 60%)

Koji Kanemoto (97 title-related matches, 49%)

Shinjiro Otani (75 title-related matches, 51%)

Tatsuhito Takaiwa (68 title-related matches, 52%)

Kendo Kashin (65 title-related matches, 53%)

2001

Keiji Muto (47 matches, 89%)

Yuji Nagata (119 matches, 89%)

Masahiro Chono (50 matches, 88%)

Hiroyoshi Tenzan (121 matches, 87%)

Satoshi Kojima (120 matches, 87%)

Scott Norton (63 matches, 87%)

Manabu Nakanishi (117 matches, 86%)

Scott Hall (43 matches, 84%)

Kensuke Sasaki (63 matches, 82%)

Tatsumi Fujinami (44 matches, 76%)

2001 Others Not Included

Minoru (86 title-related matches, 52%)

El Samurai (74 title-related matches, 46%)

Jushin Thunder Liger (61 title-related matches, 66%)

Kendo Kashin (55 title-related matches, 44%)

Gedo (47 title-related matches, 57%)

2002

Yuji Nagata (139 matches, 89%)

Hiroyoshi Tenzan (130 matches, 88%)

Masahiro Chono (112 matches, 87%)

Manabu Nakanishi (141 matches, 84%)

Kensuke Sasaki (85 matches, 82%)

Tadao Yasuda (101 matches, 81%)

Ryushi Yanagisawa (48 matches, 79%)

Super Strong Machine (53 matches, 79%)

Scott Norton (75 matches, 76%)

2002 Others Not Included

Koji Kanemoto (100 title-related matches, 59%)

Minoru (90 title-related matches, 61%)

Gedo (84 title-related matches, 56%)

Jushin Thunder Liger (81 title-related matches, 59%)

Osamu Nishimura (49 title-related matches, 88%)

2003

Yoshihiro Takayama (76 matches, 91%)

Hiroyoshi Tenzan (115 matches, 90%)

Scott Norton (49 matches, 89%)

Masahiro Chono (62 matches, 88%)

Yuji Nagata (114 matches, 87%)

Manabu Nakanishi (84 matches, 82%)

Tadao Yasuda (100 matches, 79%)

Hiroshi Tanahashi (115 matches, 78%)

Mike Barton (50 matches, 77%)

Kazunari Murakami (48 matches, 76%)

2003 Others Not Included

Jushin Thunder Liger (107 title-related matches, 57%)

Yutaka Yoshie (89 title-related matches, 77%)

Tiger Mask IV (80 title-related matches, 52%)

Koji Kanemoto (66 title-related matches, 58%)

Minoru (53 title-related matches, 53%)

Gedo (51 title-related matches, 46%)

Togi Makabe (49 title-related matches, 91%)

Jado (45 title-related matches, 47%)

2004

Yuji Nagata (131 matches, 88%)

Masahiro Chono (84 matches, 88%)

Hiroyoshi Tenzan (137 matches, 86%)

Scott Norton (55 matches, 85%)

Kensuke Sasaki (74 matches, 85%)

Manabu Nakanishi (130 matches, 82%)

Hiroshi Tanahashi (142 matches, 80%)

Genichiro Tenryu (47 matches, 79%)

Kazunari Murakami (51 matches, 77%)

Tadao Yasuda (37 matches, 75%)

2004 Others Not Included

Minoru (119 title-related matches, 62%)

Minoru Suzuki (90 title-related matches, 69%)

Gedo (79 title-related matches, 55%)

Tiger Mask IV (58 title-related matches, 55%)

2005

Hiroyoshi Tenzan (103 matches, 92%)

Masahiro Chono (78 matches, 89%)

Yuji Nagata (117 matches, 88%)

Hiroshi Tanahashi (98 matches, 86%)

Manabu Nakanishi (116 matches, 85%)

Shinsuke Nakamura (98 matches, 85%)

Kendo Kashin (33 matches, 82%)

Minoru Suzuki (32 matches, 79%)

2005 Others Not Included

Hirooki Goto (93 title-related matches, 53%)

Tiger Mask IV (90 title-related matches, 65%)

Koji Kanemoto (56 title-related matches, 72%)

2006

Shinsuke Nakamura (47 matches, 91%)

Masahiro Chono (75 matches, 87%)

Hiroshi Tanahashi (116 matches, 83%)

Giant Bernard (95 matches, 81%)

Hiroyoshi Tenzan (109 matches, 81%)

Travis Tomko (44 matches, 79%)

Yuji Nagata (113 matches, 78%)

Manabu Nakanishi (111 matches, 77%)

Akebono (45 matches, 77%)

Riki Choshu (82 matches, 76%)

2006 Others Not Included

Koji Kanemoto (86 title-related matches, 64%)

Gedo (69 title-related matches, 56%)

El Samurai (59 title-related matches, 55%)

Minoru (49 title-related matches, 58%)

Tiger Mask IV (47 title-related matches, 59%)

2007

Hiroshi Tanahashi (84 matches, 87%)

Yuji Nagata (105 matches, 85%)

Giant Bernard (79 matches, 82%)

Masahiro Chono (75 matches, 79%)

Travis Tomko (58 matches, 76%)

Togi Makabe (101 matches, 76%)

Shiro Koshinaka (78 matches, 75%)

2007 Others Not Included

Minoru (72 title-related matches, 49%)

Ryusuke Taguchi (61 title-related matches, 45%)

Koji Kanemoto (59 title-related matches, 57%)

Manabu Nakanishi (55 title-related matches, 83%)

Gedo (54 title-related matches, 41%)

2008

Hiroshi Tanahashi (58 matches, 86%)

Shinsuke Nakamura (106 matches, 86%)

Hirooki Goto (106 matches, 79%)

Togi Makabe (107 matches, 79%)

Yuji Nagata (79 matches, 76%)

Giant Bernard (83 matches, 75%)

2008 Others Not Included

Toru Yano (98 title-related matches, 74%)

Wataru Inoue (57 title-related matches, 55%)

AKIRA (56 title-related matches, 52%)

Tiger Mask IV (50 title-related matches, 51%)

Gedo (48 title-related matches, 59%)

Jado (47 title-related matches, 57%)

Takashi Iizuka (47 title-related matches, 74%)

2009

Hiroshi Tanahashi (93 matches, 94%)

Shinsuke Nakamura (110 matches, 82%)

Hirooki Goto (109 matches, 79%)

Yuji Nagata (106 matches, 78%)

2009 Others Not Included

Tiger Mask IV (84 title-related matches, 55%)

Prince Devitt (70 title-related matches, 61%)

2010

Hiroshi Tanahashi (115 matches, 93%)

Shinsuke Nakamura (106 matches, 88%)

Togi Makabe (114 matches, 86%)

Satoshi Kojima (38 matches, 80%)

Hirooki Goto (118 matches, 79%)

Masato Tanaka (38 matches, 78%)

2010 Others Not Included

Prince Devitt (81 title-related matches, 62%)

Karl Anderson (79 title-related matches, 65%)

Tetsuya Naito (77 title-related matches, 75%)

Giant Bernard (76 title-related matches, 66%)

Yujiro (75 title-related matches, 73%)

Ryusuke Taguchi (63 title-related matches, 62%)

Toru Yano (58 title-related matches, 87%)

Takashi Iizuka (51 title-related matches, 78%)

Wataru Inoue (50 title-related matches, 74%)

Gedo (48 title-related matches, 66%)

Yuji Nagata (48 title-related matches, 76%)

2011

Hiroshi Tanahashi (106 matches, 96%)

Shinsuke Nakamura (108 matches, 81%)

Togi Makabe (112 matches, 80%)

Hirooki Goto (105 matches, 79%)

Satoshi Kojima (93 matches, 77%)

Minoru Suzuki (71 matches, 76%)

2011 Others Not Included

Prince Devitt (93 title-related matches, 68%)

Karl Anderson (82 title-related matches, 60%)

Giant Bernard (82 title-related matches, 63%)

Ryusuke Taguchi (58 title-related matches, 69%)

MVP (51 title-related matches, 73%)

2012

Hiroshi Tanahashi (110 matches, 94%)

Kazuchika Okada (111 matches, 90%)

Shinsuke Nakamura (111 matches, 87%)

Hirooki Goto (113 matches, 85%)

Tetsuya Naito (81 matches, 83%)

Masato Tanaka (44 matches, 81%)

Karl Anderson (94 matches, 76%)

2012 Others Not Included

Hiroyoshi Tenzan (83 title-related matches, 61%)

Satoshi Kojima (82 title-related matches, 62%)

Tomohiro Ishii (54 title-related matches, 81%)

Yujiro (53 title-related matches, 90%)

YOSHI-HASHI (50 title-related matches, 81%)

2013 (Jan-Sept)

Kazuchika Okada (78 matches, 91%)

Hiroshi Tanahashi (76 matches, 86%)

Tetsuya Naito (32 matches, 80%)

Shinsuke Nakamura (67 matches, 80%)

Prince Devitt (67 matches, 76%)

King Fale (26 matches, 26%)

Gedo (58 matches, 75%)

Togi Makabe (75 matches, 75%)

2013 Others Not Included

Satoshi Kojima (42 title-related matches, 67%)

Minoru Suzuki (37 title-related matches, 81%)

TAKA Michinoku (33 title-related matches, 79%)

Toru Yano (33 title-related matches, 66%)

Alex Shelley (32 title-related matches, 52%)

Tomohiro Ishii (31 title-related matches, 81%)

As one can see, some wrestlers (such as Hiroshi Tanahashi) can become elevated over time in NJPW while other former main events may remain in midcard status for years.

ATTENDANCE REGRESSION

Taking the 13 wrestlers who appear the most in 1999-2013 (giving full point to people with 75%+ placement and half point for people on the 50+ titleholder list), the candidates were: Yuji Nagata, Hiroshi Tanahashi, Masahiro Chono, Hiroyoshi Tenzan, Manabu Nakanishi, Shinsuke Nakamura, Satoshi Kojima, Scott Norton, Togi Makabe, Hirooki Goto, Kensuke Sasaki, Gedo and Giant Bernard.

1999-2001: Yuji Nagata, Masahiro Chono, Hiroyoshi Tenzan, Manabu Nakanishi, Satoshi Kojima, Scott Norton, Kensuke Sasaki

2002-2005: Yuji Nagata, Masahiro Chono, Hiroyoshi Tenzan, Manabu Nakanishi along with Hiroshi Tanahashi and Scott Norton

2006-2012: Hiroshi Tanahashi (primary), Shinsuke Nakamura, Hirooki Goto, Yuji Nagata, Giant Bernard

Running a regression of points by wrestler versus the "core attendance" by year resulted in:

Wrestler	Effect
Masahiro Chono	5,932
Shinsuke Nakamura	2,721
Scott Norton	2,567
Hiroyoshi Tenzan	1,087
Yuji Nagata	522
Togi Makabe	388
Satoshi Kojima	180
Kensuke Sasaki	105
Giant Bernard	(198)
Gedo	(226)
Hirooki Goto	(357)
Hiroshi Tanahashi	(571)
Manabu Nakanishi	(7,101)

Any way you cut the attendance, it's going to favor wrestlers from the 1999-2001 strongly over wrestlers from 2008-2013 since core attendance was down almost 800 people per show.  Does this analysis really suggest that Scott Norton is a bigger draw than Hiroshi Tanahashi?  Not really; instead it just shows how even with a scattered mix of wrestlers, no one has recently been turning the business around (at least in terms of attendance) and that wrestlers that were on top during the stronger era (such as Norton) are average better numbers than someone like Yuji Nagata who was around through it all.

CORE ATTENDANCE BY IWGP CHAMPION

We can look at attendance by IWGP Champion (irrespective of whether the IWGP Champion even appeared on the show).  I'm going to limit this to the "Core Attendance" shows (which are shows with between 1,000 and 10,000 people) so we're not skewing by dome shows.  However, this metric already inherently is going to be skewed since we're not normalizing for time of year or other annual trends.

Scott Norton was IWGP champion during 4 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 5,143

Genichiro Tenryu was IWGP champion during 3 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 3,731

Tadao Yasuda was IWGP champion during 12 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 3,512

Keiji Muto was IWGP champion during 183 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 3,023

Kensuke Sasaki was IWGP champion during 145 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 2,953

Kazuyuki Fujita was IWGP champion during 151 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 2,911

Yuji Nagata was IWGP champion during 171 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 2,665

Yoshihiro Takayama was IWGP champion during 62 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 2,594

Satoshi Kojima was IWGP champion during 42 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 2,582

Vacated was IWGP champion during 62 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 2,563

Hiroshi Tanahashi was IWGP champion during 301 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 2,443

Shinsuke Nakamura was IWGP champion during 90 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 2,426

Kazuchika Okada was IWGP champion during 76 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 2,408

Togi Makabe was IWGP champion during 43 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 2,298

Hiroyoshi Tenzan was IWGP champion during 60 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 2,216

Brock Lesnar was IWGP champion during 81 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 2,161

Bob Sapp was IWGP champion during 20 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 1,972

Manabu Nakanishi was IWGP champion during 12 class C-G shows; average attendance  was 1,466

Average attendance over 1,518 class C-G shows was 2,624

If we're ranking long-term champions, it would probably be Muto, Sasaki, Fujita then Tanahashi.

Analysis by Chris Harrington (chris.harrington@gmail.com)

Wrestling Observer HOF Age of Inductees

Wrestlers that were alive, above 45 years old at time of induction after 1996..

2012 Mick McManus (age 92; died in May 2013)
2009 Konnan (age 46)
2009 The Midnight Express (Bobby Eaton, Stan Lane and Dennis Condrey) (average age about 55)
2009 Masa Saito (age 68)
2006 Hiroshi Hase (age 46)
2005 The Fabulous Freebirds (Michael Hayes, Terry Gordy, and Buddy Roberts) (average age about 51, Gordy had died and Roberts died this year)
2004 Bob Backlund (age 55)
2001 Black Shadow (age 81; died in March 2007)
2001 Lizmark (age 52)
1998 Dos Caras (age 48)
1997 Édouard Carpentier (age 71; died in October 2010)

Alfonso Morales (age 64) and Jim Ross (age 48) were inducted as well while they were alive but over the age of 45.

Living and inducted under the age 45 from 1997 onwards: John Cena, Chris Jericho, Rey Mysterio, Jr., The Rock, Aja Kong, Masakatsu Funaki, Paul Heyman, Triple H, Kurt Angle, Masahiro Chono, Kazushi Sakuraba, Último Dragón, The Undertaker, Chris Benoit, Shawn Michaels, Manami Toyota, Kenta Kobashi, Bull Nakano, El Satánico, Akira Hokuto, Steve Austin, Mick Foley, Shinya Hashimoto, Lioness Asuka, Jushin Liger, Keiji Mutoh, Chigusa Nagayo, El Hijo del Santo, Toshiaki Kawada

Posthumous inductees (after the initial 1996 class): Henri Deglane, Hans Schmidt, Gus Sonnenberg, Lou Albano, Kent Walton, Steve Williams, Curtis Iaukea, Wladek Zbyszko, Roy Shire, Everett Marshall, Bill Miller, Martín Karadagian, Tom Packs, Evan Lewis, Paul Bowser, Eddie Guerrero, Tarzán Lόpez, Earl Caddock, Jack Curley, Wahoo McDaniel, Martin Burns, Diablo Velasco, Bill Longson, Frank Sexton, Sandor Szabo, Jimmy Lennon, William Muldoon (Dr. Death would have been 52 and Eddie would have been only 39 years old at time of induction.)

I couldn't find the birthdate of Francisco Flores (UWA promoter).

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Ai2omvwyNNesdEpLQ3lsN2YyZHduQUZkLTVfWHZ5N0E&usp=sharing

Can the WWE Network succeed?

Can the WWE Network succeed?

Nov 1 2013 

Analysis by Chris Harrington (chris.harrington@gmail.com)

Since the WWE Network was trumpeted publicly in September 2011 on Monday Night Raw, speculation has run wild and solid facts have been scarce. Clearly WWE over-promised when they announced it was coming “sometime in 2012” even going as far as to strongly hint that Wrestlemania XXVIII (April 1, 2012) would be the launch day. Two years after the initial announcement, WWE has yet to provide fully concrete details on pricing, timing, cable/dish company provider distribution and programming content. With so many questions looming and the future so uncertain, does the WWE Network really have any chance of success?

Yes. After careful consideration, I certainly believe that the WWE Network has a real chance for success. In the course of this piece, I aim to paint a holistic picture of the current state of WWE Financials, and why a bold new venture such as the WWE Network is a good move for the company.

First, let’s look at the financial trends for the company.

Second, let’s review the company’s history with taking risks.

Third, let’s talk about what we do and don’t know about the network itself.

COMPANY FINANCIALS

Let’s look at the Seven-Year Trend for WWE

Out of WWE’s four core segments (Live & TV Entertainment, Digital Media, Consumer Products and WWE Studio) only one area is substantially growing – Live & TV Entertainment and that growth is fueled by one thing: TV Rights Fees.

The difference between today and 2007 levels is that WWE has shrunk $68 million PPV revenue while they have grown $213 million in TV Rights Fees.  Live events alone have generated $88 million more in the last six years which offset the entire PPV business losses.  WWE recognizes that they are a television brand much more than they are a PPV brand.  The WWE Network gives them an excellent opportunity to marry the two in a way that could be far more beneficial to WWE in the end.

Meanwhile, Digital Media (WWE.com and WWEShop) and WWE Studios have not been stellar sources of growth while Consumer Products (Home Entertainment and Magazine Publishing especially)  have been on a downward trend for years.  Consumer Products has been falling downwards from $138 million in 2008 to $83 million in 2013. There’s absolutely a future opportunity in licensing (the annual video game money has proven this), but for the big picture, WWE’s vast growth is going to come on the backs of TV Rights increases.

Consider this: when WWE messages potential investors, they break out their top eight areas:

·         Live Events and Venue Merchandise: low to medium growth; low risk

·         Television: high growth; low to medium risk

·         Pay-per-view: low growth; medium to high risk

·         Licensing: high growth; low to medium risk

·         Home Video: low growth; medium to high risk

·         Digital Advertising & Content Licensing: medium to high growth; low to medium risk

·         Shop (WWEShop): low to medium growth; medium risk

·         Studios (formerly WWE Films): medium growth; medium to high risk

Again, the only two segments that have the desired mix of high growth potential and lower risk are Television and Licensing. The downside is that expanding in television isn’t cheap; WWE ranked Television second highest in capital intensity (medium intensity) only behind the money-draining WWE Studios project (high intensity).

TAKING RISKS

Titan’s history has many cautionary tales of their odd detours and poorly executed side ventures. One cannot forget milestones such as the failed WBF (World Bodybuilding Federation) and related  ICOPRO supplements (in with a bang, out with a whimper), the investment in Evel Knievel’s jump over Snake River (McMahon’s filed for bankruptcy in 1976), the infamous XFL debacle alongside NBC (total losses were $138 million with WWFE covering half), the Times Square World Restaurant (which lost more than $5 million by the time they finally shut it down), considering opening a World Wrestling Federation Casino (at the former Debbie Reynolds Hotel and Casino location). Plus there were the high profile government exchanges including the 1991 Zahorian Steroid Scandal and the Chairman Henry Waxman Steroid Use in Sports investigation in 2008 covering Professional Wrestling.

There are other miscalculations – failing to follow adequately promote and follow up on their once-in-a-lifetime dirt-cheap WCW purchase, launching the ECW Brand as a separate touring entity, the Sugar Ray Leonard boxing PPVs flops, programming tasteless and vindictive angles (and the future sponsorships it may have endangered), investing in vanity projects (including Linda McMahon spending $97 million to not be elected and the in-house music label, Stephanie Music) plus movie projects like “No Holds Barred” and most recently the continuing string of write-offs generated by WWE Studios. (This doesn’t even touch on the enormous human toll related to former wrestlers who have died young and of heart failure, the spotty enforcement of substance abuse policies, the questionable independent contractor policy and other muddled issues.)

On the flipside, Vincent Kennedy McMahon has taken big risks which paid off huge. 

His national expansion strategy - secretly buying Capital Sports, taking top talent from rival federations, paying television stations to carry his wrestling program in major markets – was a bold, audacious move and it worked.  Vince especially recognized the power of syndicated television and worked vigorously throughout the 1980s to crowd out his competitors with a slick, superior-produced product.  He formed early partnerships with important cable networks like USA (All American Wrestling, Tuesday Night Titans and Prime Time Wrestling) , MTV (with the War to Settle the Score and Cyndi Lauper) and HBO (airing Madison Square Garden shows since the 1970s).  This deals providing the channels with content when they were in their infancy stages and McMahon’s product with increased exposure. The feather in his cap building the Wrestlemania phenomenon (and harnessing the huge closed circuit business alongside it). But importantly he was able to move past the closed circuit era and bring the WWF to pay-per-view.

In the 1980’s, the business was still dominated by live events – bringing the big stars to your town to wrestle.  However, over the 1990s, WWF continued to develop the revenue streams into television, PPV, and eventually licensing which would equal and surpass the live gates. With the advent of Monday Night Raw, they cemented a strong cable legacy of weekly, often live wrestling. In time the PPV schedule grew and they learned from experimentation with timing (Tuesday in Texas, Taboo Tuesday) and pricing variations what their viewers would and would not purchase.  As the attitude era exploded, WWF made the risky choice to go public.  At the dawn of the millennium, they recognized the diminishing value of syndicated network and instead moved more and more to work within cable synergies leading to a valuable and difficult contract struggle where Monday Night Raw moved from NBC/USA to Viacomm’s TNN.  The negotiations and subsequent move lead to an explosion in WWE’s Television Right Fees which has continued to this day.  Most recently, assertive international negotiations have expanded WWE’s presence internationally which has provided not only fruitful touring grounds but lucrative television contracts.

In short, the many of the areas which McMahon took aggressive (and productive) risks were related to television– finding a wedge into markets using a syndicated network, creating Wrestlemania and revolutionizing the wrestling PPV event, conducting complex contract negotiations and leveraging cable synergies to find the best home for this product on the television channels.  It’s in this paradigm that the WWE Network seems like an appropriate risk to pursue.

THE NETWORK ITSELF

While the company has been opaque on particulars regarding the WWE Network launch, there has been numerous breadcrumb trails which offer insights:

Timing is a slippery thing

2014? WWE Executive Vice President of Creative development and Operations Stephanie McMahon was quoted by Broadcasting & Cable during October 2013 NYC Television week, "We are looking at traditional and nontraditional distribution, and we're targeting first quarter next year." 

2013? In August 2012, Vince McMahon tolds analysts, “I hope next quarter I will be making an announcement”. "WWE Close To Pinning New Net." Daily Variety 316.24 (2012)

2012? Trade publications such as Multichannel News reported in April 2011 that World Wrestling Entertainment was “working on a cable network as part of a major rebrand of the company” Umstead, R. Thomas. "WWE Cable Network Will Tag In For 2012." Multichannel News 32.15 (2011): 28.

2011? Going back to the earnings call in February 2010, Vince McMahon specifically noted that they’d been doing a “great deal of due diligence” on working on a standalone WWE cable network.

Ever? Vince McMahon probably put it best during a July 2012 interview, “I don’t want to commit to a time, you know, because it’s probably not a good idea for us to do that. I’d rather not say.” "Ringmaster." Multichannel News 33.29 (2012): 14-16. 

In WWE’s Business Plan and Potential Path toSignificant Earnings Growth, they suggested the network could be offered as a Premium Channel at between $13 and $15 per month.

Content

·                     On the proposed WWE Network, all WWE Pay-per-views with the noted exception of Wrestlemania would be available.

·                     WWE would be developing both new reality series (the taped, previewed but never aired Legends House, for instance) and harnessing their vast tape library.

·                     From the very beginning, WWE has emphasized that their core, first-run weekly programming such as Raw and Smackdown would not be moved to the new WWE Network. Instead those shows would be remain separate contracted entities. It’s possible that WWE Network would add pre and post shows to the broadcasts. It’s likely WWE programming will include rebroadcasting already aired weekly episodic TV shows, it remains to be seen just how long will elapse between when shows first air on their primary network (currently NBCU channels) and when they would be shown again on the WWE Network.

What is taking so long?

From a company that has showed remarkable skill to pivot on a weekly basis (at least creatively), roll out of the actual network has certainly taken much longer than originally expected.

Some of it was distribution problems. For instance, in March 2012, with the strongly foreshadowed but not outright promised April 1 launch looming, the New York Post reported that WWE had "yet to strike a single deal with a cable or satellite-TV provider to carry its own cable channel". Their goal of 40 million homes did not materialize. Shortly after the supposed Wrestlemania launch day came and went, a month later CEO Vince McMahon said, “the (network) holdup is on our end, it’s not on the end of the distributors.” Soule, Alexander. "WWE Network Inches Along." Fairfield County Business Journal 48.20 (2012): 9 

WWE claims they are committed to learning from the mistakes of others. There’s certain ample material in the difficult, cumbersome and troublesome experience of launching a new channel. For instance, Oprah Winfrey’s OWN network famously joined the cable docket in January 2011. However, it’s struggled immensely since its introduction – a May 2012 Bloomberg News estimated $330 million in losses after just 15 months. In an interview with R. Thomas Umstead and Mark Robichaux in July 2012 (while promoting the Raw 1,000^th episode), Vince McMahon specifically diagnosed OWN faltering network problems noting that, “Oprah herself is a brand. Anything beyond herself is not a brand… So the very thing that catapulted her into stardom year after year was not on her network. Certainly, we’re not going to make that mistake.” For the McMahon’s, they see the appeal of a channel that is an extension of the WWE brand.  However, this predicates itself on the notion that the WWE Network channel must have WWE brand content that is fans will pay to see.

Obviously, hiring for a complex new venture like this is neither easy or cheap. WWE CFO George Barrios noted they expected to spendbetween $30 million and $45 million to get things running and hiring 200 employees.

Content

WWE has offered content through premium services in the past. For almost a decade they’ve offered a subscription video on demand services (originally WWE 24/7 later rechristened WWE Classics of Demand). With a few hundred thousand subscribers the service has generated annual revenues around $5 million to $7 million – only about 2% of their total Live & TV Entertainment segment. Just offering old content isn’t enough of a hook.

For a truly successful WWE Network, they need something that would be monumentally important enough to WWE fans that a substantial proportion, more than a million households would subscribe to. The current model seems to dangle the non-Wrestlemania PPV business as the bait. The idea would be for a low subscription price (probably between $7 and $15 a month), fans would get access to the same PPVs that normally cost $45 (SD) to $55 (HD) domestically.

It’s important to note that the plan is for WWE PPVs to continue to be offered on pay-per-view. While the premium channel offers a nice enticement to WWE fans (save $40 and see the show), they stil have another option for people who are only interested in select events. This ensures that cable and satellite providers that don’t choose to carry the new premium WWE Network would still be able to supply WWE fans with monthly action (and split the revenue with the company). Also, it provides a failsafe that should WWE Network capsize and disappear, there is still a method to distribution the PPVs without interruption. Lastly, WWE remains an important player in the PPV industry (and one of the pioneers who helped grow the practice) – they know that only their biggest event, Wrestlemania, is truly a competitor to Boxing and UFC megaevents.

It’s certainly a large and risky gamble, but I don’t feel it’s a fool’s gambit destined for failure. There are scenarios where the financials work out – and in some cases, work out massively in favor of WWE Network.

First of all, as discussed in the company financials section, PPV has not been a growing business for WWE for a long time. Other organizations, specifically UFC and Boxing, have proven that the final nail has yet to be driven into the PPV coffin. But the reality has set in for WWE that beyond the granddaddy of them all, Wrestlemania, most of their PPV events (even with high-priced talent such as the The Rock and Brock Lesnar) can’t hold a candle to their record PPV levels set during the Attitude Era.

Instead, WWE has pulled back on the number of pay-per-view events, increased the price of PPV (most recently achieving a subtle $10 boost from many consumers by offering their PPVs in HD for an extra price) and continued to grow their overall revenue from increasing Television Rights Fees. Put bluntly, WWE has not been growing non-WM PPV revenue. It’s time for a new approach, and unless WWE can master streaming video-on-demand services to cut out of the cable/satellite provider as a middle-man, their next best option is moving the PPV content onto a platform such as a premium channel where they can reach more people and not be hamstrung into splitting PPV buy revenue with distributors.

WWE is also aiming to strike while the iron is hot. According to a January 2013 article from Ad Age, cable companies are looking to drop networks (as Time Warner did with the Ovation channel). The message to aspiring networks is clear: the only thing getting attention from distributors are live sports.

Live sports are popular for several reasons.  For one, they are perceived as DVR-proof which means that audiences watch the show live and that includes watching the commercials. Secondly, live sports are exclusive and these rabid fan bases will keep their cable & satellite subscriptions in order to retain their ability to view live sports.  All of this has corresponded with skyrocketing sports right fees. 

WWE is doing everything they can to lump themselves in with the live sports crowd.  They want WWE Network to be counted amongst the midst of the Golf Channel, MLB TV, NHL Network, Outdoor Channel, Sportsman Channel, The Ski Channel, World Fishing Network, and NBA TV.

WWE knows the enormous money that sports leagues are getting.  For instance, NASCAR signed a10 year, $4.4 billion deal with NBC in Summer 2013.  This is why WWE has been projecting such confidence in each conference call that they are going to vastly increase their Television Rights Fees when their Raw and Smackdown come up for contract renewals in 2014. And on the heels of this, WWE is trying to launch WWE Network, which is essentially a premium sports entertainment channel.  While it’s an uphill battle, it’s a decent fit.  At least they are coming at the marketplace armed with two things that cable and satellite providers want to see – a huge & loyal audience fanbase (which has a history of paying to consume their product) and a package filled with exclusive, live sports.  In this way, the WWE Network is really more of a monthly PPV network filled with other supplemental content which is actually radically different from just being a snazzier version of a dedicated WWE Classics on Demand 24/7 channel.

The Future

I believe firmly now is the time for this project like this.  The most difficult math is around the financials for the WWE Network.

WWE has repeatedly offered up hefty numbers suggesting things such as the domestic fanbase is composed to 57 million households (based on an independent survey of 9,000 households and extrapolating to digital multichannel households) with some affinity for WWE programming.

It’s bold claim which puzzles why they only have 4 to 5 million weekly viewers for a show such as RAW and less than three million cumulative domestic (US & Canada) PPV buys (across 13+ events) each year.

It’s time to finally do some math and determine whether the WWE Network is viable.

First, one should quantify what is at risk – the most immediate danger is that WWE would lose the domestic pay-per-view revenue for all PPVs besides Wrestlemania.  I’ve estimated that the 2014 Domestic PPV market for WWE is worth between $35 million and $40 million.  It’s important to emphasize that number because that’s the revenue that WWE is potentially giving up if a premium channel such as WWE Network which offered monthly WWE PPVs (except for Wrestlemania) was fully distributed in the domestically. In addition, there is the cost of running the WWE Network. 

One estimate that for a breakeven point which has been bandied about one million subscribers. Both Dave Meltzer and the WWE have calculated a similar number though they use different methods:

·         Dave estimates the network would cost $50 million a year.  He figures that all of the annual domestic revenue for non-WrestleMania shows (approximated at $35 million) would be cannibalized.  If WWE receives half of the subscriber monthly fee for an entire year, that would be about $90 million dollars ($7.50/month x 12 months x 1 million subscribers) which would cover the $85 million ($50 million cost and $35 million lost PPV).

·         WWE wrote that should the network achieve between 2 million and 4 million subscribers that would “represent incremental revenue to WWE of between $125 million and $250 million”.  Assuming this lower bound corresponds to erases existing domestic PPV revenue (about $40 million), that implies 2 million subscribers equals about $165 million in revenue (which implies earning about $6.88 per monthly subscriber which is firmly at the 50% mark for the midpoint of their monthly network cost at between $12.99 to $14.99.)

·         Most importantly, WWE emphasized that they believe they could achieve “incremental EBITDA between $50 million and $150 million” with a 2 to 4 million subscriber base.  Since they explicitly state that “until a base of approximately 1 million subscribers is achieved, we estimate the network would represent a net investment for WWE”.  WWE’s entire annual EBITDA has been on the low end of $50M to $60M recently, so earning an additional $50M to $100M would be massive.

Can they get there?

I’ve done some extensive regression analysis looking at what would WWE PPVs would perform at different price points..

This looks at the worldwide buys.  If we assume that the WWE Network would be priced between $10 and $15 and would include the major PPVs except Wrestlemania, then average( 1205000 , 888000 ) x 70% domestic = 732,550 subscribers.  If you look at the WM calibre number, it would be 2.2 million subscribers.  The midpoint of the two estimates is 1.5 million subscribers - firmly in the "above break-even" but below "wildly profitable" point.

With full distribution, for a network on the level of Royal Rumble/SummerSlam, with the proper gestation period (i.e. ramp up period will probably be at least 9-18 months from launch), they should be able to hit three-quarters of a million subscribers.  If they can make things more exciting and turn the clock back to 5-8 years ago, they could hit above a million subscribers.

Summary of Findings

While WWE has had some high-profile failures, their greatest successes have come when they took risky ventures related to television expansions (syndicated TV, cable networks, TV Rights Fees with cable synergies, PPV, international expansions).  Only element of WWE's business that has shown both growth potential and actual growth has been in TV Rights - PPV has continued to slip.  Using regression based on domestic PPV consumption at different price points over the last many years, model suggests that a $15 WWE Network with full distribution could achieve at least a million subscribers.  The delays and struggles we've seen reflect WWE's priorities in re-negotiating their Raw and Smackdown contracts with NBCU (and other possible players), utilizing the growing Live Sports fee trends (potential to double-triple TV Rights Fees) and the extensive staffing and building the WWE Network.  This is a terrific opportunity to vastly grow WWE at a rate they haven't been able to do through Consumer Products, international expansions or PPV mega-events. The single most unclear point is how Cable and Satellite providers will react and whether WWE Network can get nearly the full distribution they need in order to be possibly successful; whether this will be part of the the flagship show 2014 negotiations is unclear.

Chris Harrington

chris.harrington@gmail.com

@mookieghana

WWE Rolling 12 Month Revenue Trends

Analysis by Chris Harrington (indeedwrestling@gmail.com)

WWE announced 3rd Quarter earnings this Halloween morning.

Their focus is clearly on their upcoming TV Rights negotiations (both domestic and international) and they are projecting confidence at being able to substantially increase their rates (there were numerous comparisons to NASCAR which just signed a lucrative deal). WWE emphatically stated they believed they have their new domestic deal TV rights deal for RAW/Smackdown completed by April.  That would be well before the contracts end in Q4 2014 (September/October).  Again, there was nothing important said about the WWE Network launch which makes early next year seem extremely unlikely to me.

First, let's look at some rolling 12 month numbers - (Beginning 4th Quarter of previous fiscal year through 3rd Quarter of this fiscal year)

Summary

• Live & TV Entertainment (Live Events and Venue Merchandise sales, TV Rights & Advertising, PPV) has grown about $9.0 million a year.  
• Meanwhile Consumer Products (Licensing, Home Entertainment, Magazine) has shrunk about $6.7 million a year.  
• Digital Media (WWE.com/WWEShop) is pretty much flat and WWE Studios has been declining in revenue.

Live & Televised Entertainment

The trends have been pretty clear - the engine of growth has been TV Rights Fees.  Q3 2013 TV Rights Fees were up $10 million alone versus Q3 2013 because of TV rights fee increases along with additions of Main Event (ION) and Total Divas (E!) programming.  Considering their viewership, should WWE succeed in their negotiations they are posed to capitalize on major increase on TV Rights. Clearly, this is coming at an opportune time since Pay-per-view (which was very similar in size to TV Rights six years ago) continues to fall (it is worth noting how they've scaled back the PPV schedule to just 13 events a year).  With WWE's stated strategy of moving the non-Wrestlemania PPVs to their hypothetical premium channel (WWE Network), it's clear they are not prioritizing PPV revenue as Live & Televised Entertianment's long-term primary driver.  In today's call, WWE did tout how they've expanded PPV access to include XBOX360 and PS3 systems in 2013 so they really aren't just in a holding pattern.  Plus, at $80 million annually, PPV is still the third largest revenue stream for the company (behind TV Rights Fees and Live Events).  PPV is essentially equal to the entirety of the diminishing consumer products segment.  

Let's dig a bit deeper into the $110 million revenue stream for Live Events.

First, let's separate it into International and North America Live Event Revenue.

Noticeably, these past 12 months have represented a considerable decrease in International Live Events revenue (which was driven by the simple fact they simply ran few international events).

	12 month rolling ending
	Sept '07	Sept '08	Sept 09	Sept '10	Sept '11	Sept '12	Sept '13
Live Events	$   92.8	$ 111.1	$ 105.1	$ 107.2	$ 104.4	$ 107.3	$ 109.4
Domestic Events	246	244	258	252	252	243	256
Int'l Events	74	77	74	74	75	74	62

So, they're down almost a dozen international events for rolling 12 month 2013 which is a marked difference to prior years. Still, traditionally, the 4th quarter of the year has a considerable number of international events (more than twenty) so it will be interesting to see whether the year ends with fewer international events.

In terms of revenue per event, international events still have higher gross revenue per event, but the ratio has altered in the past two years.  From 2008-2011, revenue from international live events was almost twice as much as domestic live events ($550k vs. $261k average).  However, the domestic live event number has moved up while the international marketplace has weakened (for variety of reasons including unfavorable exchange rates, "sold shows"/international tours, and economic conditions).  Now, the ratio between int'l to domestic live event is more like 1.5x times ($471k vs. $305k).

Consumer Products

Consumer Products has not been a growing segment.  Home entertainment continues to decline, almost at a rate of $5 million a year.  Magazine publishing was dropping almost 1.8 million a year - the past 24 months have flatten out around $6 million dollars.  It will be interesting to see how many more years they continue the magazine strategy - with all of the emphasis on the WWE App, I wonder if a digital move is looming sometime in the future. Licensing has been fluctuating between $45 million and $55 million; it's inconsistent.  The licensing portion of their business isn't dying - but it's just not steadily growing either.

International vs Domestic
An unusual dynamic emerging in 2013 is the growing share of revenue coming from North American markets.  (This is tied to the decreased number of international live events.)  Previously, 35%-40% of the revenue had come from the Europe/Middle East/Africa/Asia Pacific/Latin American marketplace, but this year that number has dropped to 30%.

Revenue from Europe/Middle East/Africa has decreased significantly over the past five years almost at the rate of dropping $5 million a year though it has settled in the past two year around $70 million.  Meanwhile, Asia Pacific is slowly climbing (about a million a year); Latin America seems to be an area that has changed focus over time.  While I don't have 2013 numbers, but I know that United Kingdom revenue in particular has steadied at about $33-$36 million a year from 2009-2012 but that was down from the recent 2008 peak of over $47.3 million.

Conference Call Notes

What a very weird ending to the conference call. There was only a single caller who asked about domestic rights renewal and WWE's cryptic statement about a fail-safe restructuring "if things don't work out." After the caller finished there was silence and no one else asked questions. So they just said, "Goodbye".  Last thing you heard Vince trailing off with (and I'm not making this up) "As Daniel Bryan would say..." and then they disconnected.

They're touting a big 15.1 million weekly viewers number so they can sound really important going into the TV rights renewal process; no doubt this number is carefully crafted by adding together all of the viewers of different shows (especially Total Divas) in some goofy way. They did a lot of stressing about how they were like NASCAR because NASCAR recently signed a huge money deal. It was normal talking points about being Sports/DVR-proof programming.

They neither played up or down the possibility of the WWE Network. They threw out the vague references to how it could be traditional, cable, cell networks - and of course they're exploring all options. I didn't hear any kind of clear dates or new developing thoughts.

In regards to their major television contracts (both domestically and internationally - with UK & India being of special important), they said they expected to have things finalized by April 2014 even though the contracts don't expire until Q4 2014.

They played up how great Total Divas did and of course used goofy metrics like the improvement in the timeslot over the former programming (who knows what that was).

They noted that exchange rates variance and "economic weakness" in places like South Africa hurt some of the non-domestic revenue streams.

A few times it was noted there was a disappointment in SummerSlam results, particularly as Vince McMahon put it that "Pay-per-views are attraction events" and they didn't "knock this one out of the park". Numerous times it was noted that PPV results being weaker was because SummerSlam was down.

They are taking another $7M film impairment charge though they kept emphasizing that this was related to 2010-2012 activity and doesn't represent their current distribution model which they felt under the new model (starting with the re-release of No Holds Barred) they would eclipse the cost of capital and generate a 13% rate of return on new WWE Film projects. I got the sense that they continue to push the WWE Films as a portfolio rather than a project-by-project basis, so I think the entire project is up for a review sometime in the next 12 months but they didn't outright say that.

They mentioned that both XBOX (April?) and PS3 (August?) came online for selling PPVs and I think they even through a number of how many PPVs had been sold via PS3. I didn't write it down and haven't seen in the talking points elsewhere, but I think it was a few hundred thousand. Hopefully Seeking Alpha has the transcript up in a few days to check on that.

Regarding how they revised down expectations recently, there was talk about how expect this business should vary between $50M and $100M in OBIDA annually with a $75M as a good mid-point. For perspective, 2011 was $52M, 2012 was $63.2M and 2013 is $35.9M for 9 months (and I think $40M was this year's revised estimate). So they feel that this year is down and they've been hovering at the low end of their targets. Of course, it's always sunny days are ahead with references that once they can get this and that in place (WWE Network, new Film distribution model, new TV Rights contracts, etc.) it's going to be much higher within a few years -- we'll see!

Systematic Analysis of Meltzer ***+ ratings for WWF (1986-2013)

Systematic Analysis of Meltzer ***+ ratings for WWF (1986-2013) by Chris Harrington
email: indeedwrestling@gmail.com
twitter: @mookieghana

BACKGROUND

For years, I've harnessed the "Observer Star Ratings" blog to look at Star Accumulations by Star or Who has the Brightest Future (Age vs Star Ratings).  While I had the information of who was in the matches, I lacked other important datapoints such as length of the match, type of show or finish of match.

Through sheer will of force and extensively cross-referencing with The History of WWE I've mapped each of the matches to collect these datapoints.

I've been interested in whether or not it's possible to qualify the qualities of what distinguishes a good *** match from a great **** match.  By examining the dataset in full, can we draw any conclusions about which factors seem to influence how Dave Meltzer rated the matches?

INITIAL FINDINGS

The first thing that immediately jumps out is the relationship between star ratings and average match length.

Expressed graphically, the trend is even clearer:

It's important to pause here and note some things:

Long does not necessarily equal good.

The initial dataset was composed only of matches that were rated three stars or higher. Any findings here only apply to comparing similarly situated (three stars or higher) WWF matches.  That is to say, there are plenty of long WWE matches which were not rated even three stars.  Simply being long doesn't equate with being good.  However, among good matches, there is certainly a relationship between being longer (or at least of a certain length) and being rated highly.

Generalizations Versus Individual Examples

When you look at a scatter plot of match length versus Star Ratings (WWF), you quickly get the sense that while the general average is a relationship between longer matches and higher star ratings but you'll note that there are plenty of exceptions on either side of the trendline. 

For instance, a fifteen minute match could finish almost anywhere:

1/23/95 RAW: Smoking Gunns vs. 123 Kid/Bob Holly [15:32] = 3.00 stars

5/18/03 PPV: Brock Lesnar vs. Big Show (Stretcher) [15:28] = 3.25 stars

7/28/09 ECW: Christian vs. Zach Ryder [15:28] = 3.50 stars

7/25/99 PPV: Steve Austin vs. Undertaker (First Blood) [15:31] = 3.75 stars

7/27/03 PPV: Shelton Benjamin/Charlie Haas vs. Rey Mysterio/Billy Kidman [15:01] = 4.00 stars

6/10/13 RAW: Daniel Bryan vs. Seth Rollins [15:39] = 4.25 stars

5/19/02 PPV: Edge vs. Kurt Angle (Hair vs. Hair) [15:28] = 4.50 stars

4/1/01 PPV: Edge/Christian vs. Matt Hardy/Jeff Hardy vs. Bubba Ray Dudley/D-Von Dudley (Tables, Ladders & Chairs) [15:41] = 4.75 stars

Length alone is clearly not the only factor.  Simply knowing the length of the match does not give us enough information to accurately predict whether it's a good, great or spectacular match.

98% of Observations are below 4.5 stars

Even with over 25 years of history and a thousand datapoints, there is only a tiny portion of 4.75 and 5 stars matches from WWF to look at.  I feel that speaks volumes to the intangibles (such as crowd reaction, storyline build, performer charisma, match execution, match timing and psychology) which just aren't going to be captured in the analysis that I'm performing.

OTHER DATASET STATISTICS

SHOW TYPE

• PPV: 695 matches (all five ***** matches were on PPV)
• RAW: 137 matches
• SMACKDOWN: 124 matches
• ECW: 26 matches
• SATURDAY NIGHT'S MAIN EVENT/THE MAIN EVENT (NBC): 24 matches
• REMAINING: 20 matches (includes televised MSG shows Action Zone, Velocity, Wrestling Challenge, Prime Time Wrestling, PPV pre-show, WWE Main Event, and USA specials such as "Road to Wrestlemania")

Average Length of Match by Star Rating by Show Type

I think it's especially interesting to see that your average PPV match is at 17:13, while your network television special is only at 9:46. RAW/Smackdown bridging the gap (15:10 to 16:25 minutes).

LOCATION

• New York City, NY: 52 matches (3.67 star avg with 17 ****+ matches)
• Chicago, IL: 46 matches (3.66 star avg with 15 ****+ matches)
• Los Angeles, CA: 35 matches (3.62 star avg with 9 ****+ matches)
• Baltimore, MD: 29 matches (3.53 star avg with 4 ****+ matches)
• Pittsburgh, PA: 26 matches (3.43 star avg with 5 ****+ matches)
• Philadelphia, PA: 25 matches (3.49 star avg with 4 ****+ matches)
• Houston, TX: 25 matches (3.64 star avg with 6 ****+ matches)
• Boston, MA: 24 matches (3.47 star avg with 4 ****+ matches)
• Detroit, MI: 23 matches (3.47 star avg with 5 ****+ matches)
• East Rutherford, NJ: 21 matches (3.38 star avg with 4 ****+ matches)
• Phoenix, AZ: 20 matches (3.64 star avg with 7 ****+ matches)
• Long Island, NY: 19 matches (3.46 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• St. Louis, MO: 19 matches (3.57 star avg with 4 ****+ matches)
• Washington, DC: 16 matches (3.55 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• Providence, RI: 16 matches (3.55 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• Indianapolis, IN: 16 matches (3.48 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• Atlanta, GA: 16 matches (3.53 star avg with 4 ****+ matches)
• San Jose, CA: 15 matches (3.72 star avg with 5 ****+ matches)
• Cleveland, OH: 15 matches (3.65 star avg with 6 ****+ matches)
• Charlotte, NC: 14 matches (3.34 star avg with no ****+ matches)
• London, England: 14 matches (3.41 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• San Antonio, TX: 13 matches (3.6 star avg with 5 ****+ matches)
• Dallas, TX: 13 matches (3.88 star avg with 6 ****+ matches)
• Seattle, WA: 13 matches (3.69 star avg with 6 ****+ matches)
• Miami, FL: 13 matches (3.65 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• New Orleans, LA: 13 matches (3.81 star avg with 5 ****+ matches)
• Raleigh, NC: 12 matches (3.71 star avg with 4 ****+ matches)
• Kansas City, MO: 12 matches (3.54 star avg with 4 ****+ matches)
• Milwaukee, WI: 12 matches (3.54 star avg with 2 ****+ matches)
• Toronto, Ontario: 12 matches (3.46 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• San Diego, CA: 11 matches (3.66 star avg with 4 ****+ matches)
• Tampa, FL: 11 matches (3.52 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• Buffalo, NY: 10 matches (3.48 star avg with 1 ****+ matches)
• Las Vegas, NV: 10 matches (4 star avg with 6 ****+ matches)
• Hartford, CT: 10 matches (3.55 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• Anaheim, CA: 10 matches (3.68 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• Richmond, VA: 9 matches (3.53 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• Greensboro, NC: 9 matches (3.61 star avg with 2 ****+ matches)
• Orlando, FL: 9 matches (3.53 star avg with 2 ****+ matches)
• Albany, NY: 9 matches (3.67 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• Edmonton, Alberta: 8 matches (3.84 star avg with 4 ****+ matches)
• Sacramento, CA: 8 matches (3.66 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• Nashville, TN: 8 matches (3.75 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• Minneapolis, MN: 8 matches (3.5 star avg with 1 ****+ matches)
• Louisville, KY: 8 matches (3.66 star avg with 4 ****+ matches)
• Richfield, OH: 8 matches (3.63 star avg with 2 ****+ matches)
• Omaha, NE: 8 matches (3.66 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• Manchester, England: 7 matches (3.43 star avg with no ****+ matches)
• Portland, OR: 7 matches (3.86 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• Oklahoma City, OK: 7 matches (3.39 star avg with 1 ****+ matches)
• Cincinnati, OH: 7 matches (3.5 star avg with no ****+ matches)
• Montreal, Quebec: 7 matches (3.5 star avg with 2 ****+ matches)
• Hershey, PA: 6 matches (3.46 star avg with 1 ****+ matches)
• Glendale, AZ: 6 matches (3.71 star avg with 2 ****+ matches)
• Jacksonville, FL: 5 matches (3.6 star avg with 1 ****+ matches)
• Tulsa, OK: 5 matches (3.6 star avg with 1 ****+ matches)
• Denver, CO: 5 matches (3.65 star avg with 2 ****+ matches)
• Birmingham, AL: 5 matches (3.8 star avg with 2 ****+ matches)
• Calgary, Alberta: 5 matches (3.75 star avg with 3 ****+ matches)
• Columbus, OH: 5 matches (3.7 star avg with 1 ****+ matches)
• Ft. Wayne, IN: 5 matches (3.35 star avg with no ****+ matches)
• Fresno, CA: 5 matches (3.25 star avg with no ****+ matches)

I think it's interesting to see the top three cities (essentially Wrestlemania II cities - though I have broke out Long Island from NYC in this example) all hovering at the same 3.6 average.

REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Lastly, having a deeper understanding of the dataset gives us the opportunity to quantify a bunch of variables and see how those factors seem to influence the star rating.

RELEVANT VARIABLES:

• Length of Match in minutes
• Was it on broadcast on Monday Night Raw/Smackdown!?
• Is it not a singles match?
• Was a ladder used during the match? (i.e. TLC, Ladder match, Extreme Rules/No Holds Barred match)

FORMULA = 3.09 (INTERCEPT) + (2.77% of Match Time) + (0.11 x RAW/SM) + (-0.11 x NOT_SINGLES) + (0.36 x LADDER)  

R-squared for this formula is 0.507 but adjusted R-squared is down 0.25 which isn't great.

COMMENTARY

It's interesting to see that Singles matches (multi-man singles matches were considered singles, handicap matches were considered tag) are more highly related than tag matches and that your best bet for getting a highly rated match (in general) was on RAW and SMACKDOWN (individually they had almost the same intercept so I combined them) rather than on PPV.  The bump for LADDER match is pretty hefty - no doubt owing to the fact the 74 "ladder" matches that I noted in the dataset had 4.0 average rating.  

OTHER VARIABLES EXAMINED BUT NOT USED:

Interestingly, there was not a conclusive relationship with TITLE CHANGES (higher p-value over 0.12); intercept on TITLES CHANGE was 0.05 so it had a very nominal positive effect.  Cage matches (HITC, Elimination Chamber, Steel Cage) was also at about 0.05 intercept but an incredibly high p-value.
Being on PPV was actually associated with a negative tenth of a point but a higher p-value.

ISOLATING WRESTLERS

I experimented with isolating wrestlers that had strong performances in the tallies - namely Flair, HBK, Angle, Foley, Punk, Edge, HHH, Jericho, Rey, Eddie and Benoit.

Ric Flair, CM Punk, Rey Mysterio Jr and Eddie Guerrero all had high p-values (far above 0.25) and low intercepts which suggested there wasn't an effect that could be isolated in this regression.

Of the remaining crew, the impacts were: Foley (+0.19), Angle (+0.19), Benoit (+0.16), HBK (+0.16), Edge (+0.09), Jericho (+0.07) and HHH (-0.06, high p-value at 0.11).

Isolating wrestlers does diminish the effect of RAW/SM from 0.11 to 0.06, so it suggests some of it may be just a function of which wrestlers often appeared (such as the prime period of Smackdown).

-Chris Harrington