Wednesday, May 28, 2014

Latest WWE Business Analysis & Audio

I published two pieces recently about the WWE Network:



Basically, the first piece outlined my economic argument that Global Demand for the WWE Network (at best) just puts them in the break-even territory and they should focus on growing profitability. The second piece looks at the three options that WWE has: grow demand, raise price or cut costs.

I also published a WhatCulture piece about the Pro-wrestlers who appeared in the most Video Games which was a follow-up to a 80+ game survey I did in conjunction with Joe Gagne's Funtime Arcade but I screwed up the roster for WWE 2K14 so now I'm being raked over the coals in the comment section. That's to be expected, but whenever someone calls me "the Nate Silver of pro-wrestling" I might point them to this example.

Recently on Wrestlenomics Radio I've covered several subjects including:


This weekend's show will hopefully be John Lister & I talking about the Wrestlenomics of ECW!

Tuesday, May 20, 2014

On the idea of looking at the "Top Drawing Feuds in WWE History"

There's always a gap between what you want to quantify and what you feel like we can actually quantify. A good example of this is looking at "top drawing feuds".

It's a valid exercise: Want to prove someone is a Hall of Famer? Want to show how evidence that a wrestler is capable of moving the needle and making a difference?

However, like many 'wrestlenomic' experiments, a lack of reliable sources that cover enormous swaths of time can be quite a hindrance. Additionally, there's something to be said when you're trying to compare events from different eras. And whenever you're trying to qualify something as top - that implies that you're also capable or establishing who was at the bottom and what's a valid baseline to use.  In short, it's difficult just to pick out the "best" unless you can also rank a lot of what is clearly "not the best".  And then there's the whole aspect of trying to determine who "drew" the crowd. (Was it the title match? Was it the match that went on last? Was it the match with the "biggest" star involved?)

When you look at all of this, it's a pretty daunting task.

Usually, I try to build things incrementally.  I tackle smaller time periods and attempt to expand the range larger and larger until I've covered a decent slice. Yet, I know that my methods are always going to be imperfect and the lens of history gets pretty foggy.

We can start with some internet resources.

Among the resources that I would look at:

It's also important that we balance the drawing ability of wrestlers within their time period/territory.  For decades, WWWF was focused on the main event at Madison Square Garden.  For instance, in the 1980s, it's probably as important to weigh Network Broadcasts such as Saturday Night Main Events alongside PPV events. Also, don't be deceived that Hulk Hogan wasn't in the last match on SNME - he was purposefully placed in the middle of the card due to when the show aired.  The WWF was running hundreds and hundreds of wrestling shows (often several in a single night across many towns) in the late 1980s when things were really roaring.  There's going to be people on these cards (say a Barry O) who will be on some big drawing shows but it's hard to argue they were the "draw".  And there's going to be guys who were sent on the B-tours (and C-tours) that might have had hot feuds, but were being used to headline the smaller towns.  And there's going to be guys who were just the "monster of the week" brought in to fight the superstar such as Hogan's opponents like One Man Gang and Kamala.  In the 1990s, it's obviously more important to look at PPV events (which eventually move to a monthly format) and the number of house shows goes way down.  Instead, we see increasingly more and more content on television and a move away from syndicated programming. Television ratings start to play a substantial role. Merchandise, always a tricky topic to get solid numbers on, also continues to boom.  Moving into the modern era, WWE becomes more of a revenue machine that using many different streams to create a well-rounded balance between TV rights, live events, PPV, merchandise & licensing and a host of misc. streams (magazines, movies, digital rights, etc).

How do you qualify "top drawing"?  Is it the difference over a baseline? How do you create the baseline?  Wrestling has a natural cycle of interest - a steady build from January to Wrestlemania, a slight decrease in the Summertime, a serious dip when American Football comes back.  

There's the big feuds that we know were difference makers: The InVasion PPV pitting WCW vs WWFE. Bruno Sammartino - WWWF champion.  Hulk Hogan vs Andre the Giant.  Paul Orndorff vs Hulk Hogan.  Vince McMahon vs Steve Austin.  The Rock vs John Cena. But qualifying the next tier can be tough: Batista vs Triple H? The Undertaker's streak? Bret Hart vs Davey Boy Smith? 

If I were tackling this project, I'd probably start by looking at the Wrestling Observer Newsletter Awards for "Feud of the Year" and "Best Box Office Draw" results for the last 30 years. I'd need to weigh a lot of factors. I'd want to pull results from The History of WWE and CageMatch.net to look at attendance.  I'd probably need to develop some models so I create predictions of what I would "expect" a SummerSlam PPV to do at a certain price point, so I could compare and tell how much credit I should give to "Hulk Hogan vs Shawn Michaels" being high.

It's a worthy project, but also a very time-consuming one.

Sunday, May 18, 2014

Key questions for WWE Monday Conference Call

On Thursday, WWE announced a “multi-year strategic partnership” with NBCUniversal Cable Entertainment. While full of the requisite WWE flowery language (USA’s Monday Night Raw & SyFy’s Friday Night Smackdown are “ratings juggernauts” and “longest-running weekly episodic entertainment programs on cable TV”), the press release was noticeably light on deal specifics.
Shortly after the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) closed, the company also released a “Business Outlook” for 2014-2015. This document offered near-term financial projections including the first real insights about the size of the new domestic Television Deal. However, the information on the “key content agreements” wasn’t broken out into U.S. and international (UK/Thailand/India) TV Rights. Instead, everything was agglomerated into a curious chart promising that new “multi-year distribution agreements that became or will become effective in key countries in 2014 or early 2015” would be approximately $200M. Analysts and investors crunched the numbers, and arrived at an estimate that the new NBCU domestic television agreement (for Raw & Smackdown) was worth approximately $150M/year. That represented about a 50% increase. The Wall Street Journal succinctly summarized the situation: “generous but well short of what Wall Street had come to expect.”
The overnight market reaction was brutal. WWE stock plummeted in after-hours trading and opened Friday morning down at 45%. The stock dropped from nearly $20/share before the deal was announced on Thursday to $11/share when the NYSE opened on Friday morning. For an announcement that WWE had hyped up for months and with the specter of a huge “live sports” money contract, WWE failed to deliver on their implied promises they’d achieve “double or triple” their current domestic rights fees. Forbes, Fortune, WSJ, LA Times, MarketWatch, Sporting News, Reuters, Businessweek, Time – all wrote articles on WWE’s stock woes (often with the incorrigible wrestling puns – “Stock Slammed!”, “Smackdown!”, “Shares Get Body Slammed” and “WWE is Taking a Beating – And Not the Fake for TV Kind of Beating”). WWE needed damage control. Finally, on Friday afternoon, WWE announced that they would host a “Business Outlook Conference Call” on Monday, May 19 with CEO Vince McMahon and CFO George Barrios.
People have a lot of questions. Hopefully this call will shed some light on the murky financial guidance that has been shared thus far.
Here are the important questions that I hope the WWE will address:
  1. Will WWE clearly enumerate the size and contract lengths for each of their respective TV rights deals (both domestically and internationally)? When will the India TV rights deal negotiations be completed? What is the status of rebroadcast rights?
  2. Given the financial and business consequences of launching the WWE Network, will the company be providing more timely subscriber number updates than just once a quarter? Since they are obviously a key to WWE’s long-term financial health, why aren’t they reported as part of the monthly “Key Performance Indicators”?
  3. Will WWE provide clear accounting for the cost structure of the WWE Network including start-up costs and marketing (including “free trial” and “refer-a-friend” enticement programs)? Will they provide additional details regarding revenue splits along including the relationship with MLBAM?
  4. Is the Global launch of the WWE Network confirmed for all listed countries (United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong, Nordics) by “end of 2014” as implied in the latest Business Outlook press release?
  5. Will WWE respond to allegations that their “WWE Fan Households” consumer research resulted in an absurd worldwide inflated estimate of “77 million homes” with “affinity for WWE content”? How do they reconcile their numbers with the much lower number of weekly television viewers or other independent estimates by ESPN or Scarborough Research?
  6. What are the latest estimates for domestic Pay-Per-View retention based on the “Extreme Rules” event? How many traditional buys did the event receive? Does WWE have an estimate of how many DirecTV and Dish Network fans are “stranded” without the ability to purchase WWE PPVs but lacking broadband access to order the WWE Network? Can WWE provide specific PPV numbers for Wrestlemania beyond the general “nearly 400,000 US homes”? Does WWE have an estimate of the overlap between existing WWE Network subscribers and fans that still chose to purchase Wrestlemania via traditional means?
  7. Will WWE respond to the demands by Lemelson Capital for “urgent executive management change” and accusations of “material misrepresentations” concerning the “performance and operating profit model” of the WWE Network? Or the allegations by Shareholders Foundation over “potential securities laws violations”? Or the investigation by Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC into “whether WWE and/or its officers and directors violated state or federal securities laws”?
  8. In light of the recent NBCU deal, does WWE feel they received fair value for their retention of Chris Bevilacqua and the media advisory firm Bevilacqua Helfant Ventures? Will WWE elaborate on the number of domestic TV rights bidders and who was the highest losing bidder?
  9. Can WWE elaborate on the thinking behind keeping Smackdown on SyFy on Friday nights? Wouldn’t the property attract higher viewers either as a live show on Tuesday Night or a taped show on Wednesday or Thursday?
  10. Are there any executive management changes anticipated in light of the stock drop and the results of television negotiations? Will WWE comment on the turnover in the Media Division including the departure of Perkins Miller and Brian Maddox? Will WWE explain the termination of EVP of Programming Matthew Singerman? To replace WWE Network positions, will WWE be changing their focus from recruiting from Television Industry to recruiting from talent from over-the-top services (Amazon, Hulu, Netflix)?
The expectations for WWE’s television rights negotiations were exceptionally high. WWE played the key role in shaping those expectations. While a 50% improvement in domestic TV rights is significant, WWE overplayed their hand in the lead-up and wasn’t able to deliver the mammoth increase they implied was coming. It was dangerous wager and WWE is now in a predicament. It’ll be interesting to hear what they say on Monday to try and fix this messy situation.
Chris Harrington is a pro-wrestling analyst and writer. He publishes exclusive content at Whatculture.com and can be reached at chris.harrington@gmail.com for further discussion.
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WWE TV Deal Analysis

Yesterday, as expected, WWE announced a new, multi-year deal with NBC Universal.  NBCU will continue to air WWE programming on their networks: Raw (USA), Smackdown (SyFy) and also Total Divas (E!).  The exact terms (length, size of contract) were not revealed in at the NBC Universal Cable Upfronts presentation (where NBC Universal Chairman Bonnie Hammer and WWE Executive Vice President Paul “Triple H” Levesque took the stage and announced the deal).
After the NYSE stock market closed, WWE released a “Business Outlook”. The document offered guidance on WWE’s projected performance for 2014 and 2015. In this forecast, WWE offered some projections about several things: the size of their “Key Content Agreements”, the financial impact of WWE Network expansion, overall ranges for profitability.
Investors were not (to put it mildly) impressed.  WWE stock had closed the Thursday night at $19.93/share.  Overnight, the stock lost almost half of it’s value.  It opened at $11/share.
That’s certainly not the response that WWE wanted.  For months, they sounded the steady drumbeat that they were going to get a monumental television deal. This was their opportunity to grab some of that “live sports” money and lock down a long-term, big money contract.  WWE pointed to their high ratings.  WWE pointed to their DVR-proof programming (with 90%+ watching Raw live each week).  WWE timed their deals to be coterminous (ending at the same time).  WWE hinted at multiple bidders.  WWE signed big international television deals (UK, Thailand) that were represented several-fold increases. The company believed they had things right where they wanted them for a nice, juicy domestic TV contract.
In the middle of this, WWE decided to launch the WWE Network.  Launching the Network in February was a double-edged sword. On the plus side, it painted the WWE as an innovative and leading company that was embraced the future of digital media.  They were rolling-out a state-of-the-art over-the-top subscription service for their fans! WWE received loads of publicity, and on opening day demonstrated an the onslaught of hungry fans (who promptly crashed the servers).  On the negative side, WWE Network continues to be an expensive project with ambitious break-even points. As a result of launching, WWE’s relationship with multi-channel video programming distributors suffered and some PPV providers (notable DirecTV and Dish Network) dropped carrying WWE pay-per-views.
But, all in all, the WWE Network made WWE seem like a really big deal. Imaginations started running wild and the stock price soared (reaching $31 by mid-March). The first major hurdle was Wrestlemania 30 and proving the Network handle the demand.  Analysts were pleased to see that technology worked and the WWE Network withstood the test. Things looked rosey.
Then WWE announced the post-Wrestlemania WWE Network subscriber number.  it was 667,287 subscribers.  While some media reports proudly championed this as “well on the way to a million”, the reality stung. WWE had thought they could do better. Many Wall Street Analysts believed WWE was going to announce more than a million subscriptions.  Instead, after the biggest event of the year, WWE still had a significant way to go (300,000+).  And that was just to hit their own “break-even” point. The stock began to tumble.  Even the following week’s surprise good news – “Almost 400,000 US Households order WM30 via traditional, full-price PPV!” – did not trigger a massive stock rebound.
Things were amiss.  However, despite these hiccups, investor optimism remained.  For they were looking at the true prize which lay ahead: the new domestic TV rights deal.  While the WWE Network was a neat adventure (a noted departure from relying on selling expensive three-hour PPVs via cable and satellite systems), the real money rested in WWE’s weekly television deals.  Worldwide Pay-per-view revenue had been eclipsed by worldwide television rights fees back in 2008.  (If you include advertising alongside TV rights, they actually started beating PPV back in FY2002.)  While WWE makes a lot of money off live events ($112M), PPV ($83M) and Licensing ($46M), their largest revenue source remains their television contracts ($161M).  WWE may be a  “integrated media organization and recognized leader in global entertainment” but moreover they’re a television company. They need the weekly outlet to stay connected to their global fanbase, and without television, the company would be an exceptionally bad place.  The lessons from the collapse of their chief rival (World Championship Wrestling) are not lost on WWE: Without a television contract, a professional wrestling company is completely crippled.
Many pointed to the fact that Monday Night Raw is often the top rated show on Monday Night cable.  It regularly deliverers four million viewers (three million households) and WWE produces original content all year long.  Those are important facts, but that overlooks another stunning fact – wrestling gets lousy advertising revenue.  Despite all of those dedicated fans, advertising rates for professional wrestling remains exceptionally low.  According to Scarborough’s research, slightly more than a quarter (28%) of WWE avid fans earn more than $50,000 annually – that compares to 51% for the U.S. adult population. Compare as one might to NASCAR, you don’t see Car commercials and Beer ads during wrestling broadcasts.
Several months ago, an analyst told me that based on the advertising rates they estimated for WWE, they couldn’t fathom why a network would pay more than $160 to $180 million annually for the WWE contract.  After all, WWE viewers can’t be counted on to stick around. Or in television lingo: “WWE doesn’t provide much of a halo effect to other network programming” (with the notable exception of MMA reality shows).  Yet, without addressing this fundamental paradox, WWE continued to promise potential investors (and potential bidders) that since live sports were hot and signing huge contracts, so they expected to sign a huge contract too.
How confident was the WWE?  At the Q2 Conference Call last year (August 2013) Vince McMahon promised (with trademark gusto) that if they did not double their rights fees, the analyst could put him in a hammerlock.
Hammerlock Vkm Q2 2013
Over the past 15 years, WWE has done a decent job of diversifying their revenue streams.  This gives them some flexibility so they don’t have to rely on a single area of business (digital media, live events, licensing, magazine, television contracts, movie studio, PPV money, merchandising, etc.) to be the sole engine of growth.  However, it’s been clear for some time that bundling all of the domestic television deals together to sell them in one swoop was supposed to be prop up the company in the near-term while the WWE Network picked up steam. The guidance they realized suggests they’re expecting to lose money in 2014 (even at a million Network subscribers, they’re projecting -$20M for annual net income).  Since they keep promising future years are going to be big – built mostly on the back of WWE Network growth and WWE TV Contracts, how did they make out?
Wwe Key Content Agreements
Now, there’s something to be said for WWE’s chart: it’s confusing.  They “Key Content Agreements” represent “television distribution agreements in the U.K. and Thailand, an agreement in principle in the U.S., and an estimate for India.” The “Prior” Deals refrences 2009 to 2010, the “Current” Deals references 2013 to 2014 and the “New” Deals references 2014 to 14.  However, it appears they’re only looking at Domestic Television revenue for the “Prior” and “Current” deals.  We know that WWE grossed $73M-$83M (domestic) plus $39M-$45M (international) in TV rights in 2009-2010 alone.  Yet, they’re only showing $76M on this chart.  Baffling. Are they leaving out cancelled shows (Saturday Morning Slam, WWE Superstars, Main Event, NXT, ECW on SyFy)?  Are they leaving out non-UK International revenue (and if so, why)?  It’s a curious bit of financial “storytelling” on WWE’s part.  However you decide to slice it, it seems to imply that WWE only walked away with about $92M more in new TV deals, and some portion (we estimate a third) is from international contracts.
The current domestic WWE television contract has three pieces: Monday Night Raw, Friday Night Smackdown and Total Divas.  Combined, their 2013 value (on North American television) was worth a little under $100M.  Additionally, back in January 2014, WWE announced they’d extended their BSkyB deal in the UK (5-years).  It’s been estimated that the new agreement was worth triple the old deal, a number that some analysts have put at $30M.  Additionally, WWE negotiated a new Thailand TV deal (approximated at $3.5M, up from $500k) and is currently working on their new India TV deal (which is currently estimated at $12M; let’s assume they double it).  So, international new deals would represent about $35M in annual incremental revenue.  If WWE guidance is that new “key content agreements” are worth an increase of $92M overall, that would only leave about $57M for the domestic TV rights.  That implies domestic television rights received a little more than a 50% increase which is a far cry from “doubling the TV rights”.
It should be noted that not everyone thought the contract was going to double.  While WWE wanted a number closed to $280M and Investors salivated at the notion that the annual domestic WWE TV contract could be worth $400M, others had set more realistic estimates.  (I had suggested it would probably start in 2015 around $160M/yr – pretty close to the $150M it appears to be.)  We still don’t have guidance on the full details of the contract – how many years (typically it’s been five-years), what are the rebroadcast rights (WWE wants to get a deal at least as good as Hulu for the WWE Network to show Raw/Smackdown), will it include new WWE programming (Tough Enough was mentioned in the last conference call, but as a new show on the WWE Network), will any programming change nights (Live Smackdown on Tuesday Nights on SyFy has been rumored, but WWE wanted a large contract to offset the added cost).
It’s important to emphasize that that the sky isn’t falling.  The company is set to make a lot more money in the beginning of 2015 for producing the same amount of television content they produced in the middle of 2014.  Being cancelled by a major network would be devastating news for WWE.  That didn’t happen.  Only receiving at 50% price boost isn’t a disaster – just a failure of WWE to live up to the hype and promises they’ve been issuing. But however WWE wants to spin it, this week’s events have been a blow to WWE’s credibility. If WWE wants investors to believe their “sky’s the limit” promises about WWE Network growth (and the corresponding hundreds of millions of dollars of profit), the company needs to account for what happened so they can start rebuilding that trust.

Read more at http://whatculture.com/wwe/wwes-new-tv-deal-know.php#Fhp6tdKHOWSVagJV.99

Sunday, May 11, 2014

Raw & Nitro Quarter Hours 1999

RAW & NITRO QUARTER HOURS - 1999
source: PWI Almanac published in 2000

SHOWWEEKQ1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 OR TotalHead to Head
RAW1/4/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.9 5.6 6.0 5.2 5.7 5.7 6.2 5.9 5.1 5.8 5.8
NITRO1/4/994.9 5.6 5.9 5.8 4.4 4.4 4.5 5.1 5.1 4.7 4.1 4.6 6.5 5.0 4.7
RAW1/11/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.4 5.8 5.7 5.0 5.9 5.1 5.8 5.1 6.1 5.5 5.5
NITRO1/11/995.0 5.7 6.4 6.3 5.0 4.7 4.4 5.5 4.2 4.4 3.8 4.5 4.7 5.0 4.6
RAW1/18/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.1 5.5 5.5 5.2 5.7 6.1 5.3 6.1 6.0 5.5 5.5
NITRO1/18/994.9 5.6 6.1 6.5 4.9 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.8 3.9 4.3 4.2 5.3 4.9 4.4
RAW1/25/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.8 5.5 6.4 5.1 5.9 4.9 5.2 4.8 5.5 5.5 5.5
NITRO1/25/994.4 5.1 5.7 5.9 4.6 4.6 4.1 5.1 4.8 5.5 4.8 5.1 5.3 5.0 4.8
RAW2/1/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.3 5.9 5.7 5.4 6.0 6.0 5.7 5.7 6.0 5.9 5.9
NITRO2/1/994.6 5.6 6.0 5.9 4.3 3.7 4.3 4.8 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.9 4.7 4.3
RAW-SAT2/13/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.84.8N/A 4.3 N/A
NITRO2/8/994.8 5.3 5.4 5.4 6.2 5.7 6.1 5.9 6.0 6.0 5.7 5.6 6.4 5.7
RAW2/15/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.9 6.4 6.0 6.1 5.1 6.1 5.8 5.9 6.8 5.9 5.9
NITRO2/15/994.2 4.6 5.0 5.0 3.9 3.1 3.0 3.4 5.0 5.8 3.3 3.0 4.5 3.9 3.6
RAW2/22/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.4 5.3 6.1 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.5 6.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
NITRO2/22/994.7 4.0 5.3 5.4 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.6 4.9 4.8 4.9 4.5 3.8 4.7 4.6
RAW3/1/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.4 6.1 6.4 6.6 6.2 5.7 6.4 6.4 7.6 6.4 6.4
NITRO3/1/994.7 5.2 5.1 5.6 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 4.1 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.3 3.9
RAW3/8/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.4 6.2 7.0 6.3 6.7 6.2 7.0 6.0 6.1 6.4 6.4
NITRO3/8/994.7 5.0 5.1 5.0 3.9 4.5 3.6 4.4 3.7 4.2 3.5 4.6 5.7 4.4 4.1
RAW3/15/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.2 6.3 5.9 5.7 6.3 6.3 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.8 5.8
NITRO3/15/994.4 4.7 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.7 4.0 4.4 4.0 3.4 3.4 4.1 5.4 4.3 4.1
RAW3/22/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.4 6.9 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.1 5.7 7.1 7.7 6.4 6.4
NITRO3/22/994.2 4.8 5.2 4.9 3.6 3.0 3.7 4.1 3.6 3.4 4.1 2.9 3.5 4.0 3.6
RAW3/29/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.7 6.6 7.0 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.4 6.5 6.8 6.5 6.5
NITRO3/29/993.8 4.2 4.6 4.4 3.6 2.7 2.8 3.4 3.8 3.8 3.0 2.8 3.1 3.5 3.2
RAW4/5/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.1 5.6 6.0 5.2 6.0 5.9 6.7 5.6 7.2 5.8 5.8
NITRO4/5/993.5 4.2 4.9 4.8 4.3 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.4 3.9 5.4 4.5 5.4 4.4 4.4
RAW4/12/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.8 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.8 5.6 6.3 6.0 6.3 6.3
NITRO4/12/993.5 4.2 4.9 4.8 4.3 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.4 3.9 5.4 4.5 5.4 4.4 4.4
RAW4/19/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.0 6.1 5.8 6.1 6.4 6.6 5.7 6.8 7.1 6.1 6.1
NITRO4/19/993.7 3.9 4.3 4.9 4.1 3.6 4.1 4.1 3.9 3.8 5.0 3.4 4.4 4.1 4.1
RAW4/26/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.3 5.6 6.3 6.0 6.3 6.0 5.6 6.3 6.8 6.0 6.0
NITRO4/26/993.7 4.2 4.4 5.1 4.9 3.8 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.3 3.6 3.9 3.7
RAW5/3/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.4 5.4 6.7 6.1 6.6 6.7 7.3 6.7 7.4 6.5 6.5
NITRO5/3/993.2 3.8 4.5 4.4 3.7 3.5 3.0 3.6 2.9 2.9 2.4 2.9 3.0 3.4 3.1
RAW5/10/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.7 7.8 8.2 8.4 8.3 8.6 8.4 8.3 9.2 8.1 N/A
NITRO5/10/99N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
RAW5/17/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.0 5.1 6.1 6.2 7.3 7.1 6.5 7.1 7.8 6.4 6.4
NITRO5/17/993.4 3.8 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.8 2.9 3.2 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.6 2.4 3.3 3.1
RAW5/24/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 7.3 7.0 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.4 6.8 7.0 7.3 7.1 7.1
NITRO5/24/993.9 4.3 4.4 5.1 3.5 3.9 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.1 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.8 3.5
RAW5/31/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.9 5.9 5.7 6.5 6.6 6.4 6.6 6.8 7.3 6.2 6.2
NITRO5/31/993.8 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.0 3.3 2.4 3.2 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.0
RAW6/7/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.0 7.0 6.8 6.8 6.8 7.1 6.8 6.9 7.3 6.7 6.7
NITRO6/7/993.3 3.7 4.1 4.5 3.7 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.9 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.2
RAW6/14/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.1 6.4 6.6 7.0 7.1 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.7 6.7
NITRO6/14/993.4 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.0 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.0 3.4 3.2 3.8 3.3 3.0
RAW6/21/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.6 6.1 6.1 5.8 6.2 6.0 6.1 5.7 7.4 6.0 6.0
NITRO6/21/993.0 3.3 4.0 4.0 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.9 3.2 2.7 3.1 3.6 N/A 3.1 2.7
RAW6/28/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.3 6.0 6.6 6.7 6.9 6.7 7.3 7.1 7.1 9.5 6.8
NITRO6/28/993.2 3.7 4.6 4.2 2.8 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.3 4.4 N/A 3.9 3.6
RAW7/5/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.3 5.8 5.9 5.7 6.1 5.7 6.2 6.6 6.6 6.0 6.0
NITRO7/5/993.3 3.7 4.1 4.2 3.6 3.0 3.2 3.4 2.9 3.0 2.5 2.1 3.8 3.3 3.1
RAW7/12/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.7 5.5 5.8 5.7 6.7 6.4 6.4 6.3 7.2 6.0 6.0
NITRO7/12/993.5 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.5 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.3 3.7 4.7 4.5 3.5 3.4
RAW7/19/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.0 6.4 7.0 7.4 6.2 6.2
NITRO7/19/993.2 3.4 3.6 4.1 3.3 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.7 3.2 3.3 2.9 3.5 3.3 3.2
RAW7/26/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.2 6.7 7.8 7.0 7.8 7.4 7.3 6.6 7.5 7.1 7.1
NITRO7/26/993.3 3.8 4.4 4.5 2.9 2.6 2.7 3.5 3.0 2.7 3.5 4.1 4.3 3.4 3.2
RAW8/2/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.9 5.7 6.4 6.3 6.7 5.6 5.3 6.0 6.2 5.9 5.9
NITRO8/2/993.3 3.5 3.5 4.1 2.6 2.1 2.2 2.6 2.6 3.4 3.4 2.9 4.0 3.1 2.8
RAW8/9/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.2 6.2 6.9 6.6 6.3 6.8 6.5 6.1 6.9 6.4 6.4
NITRO8/9/993.1 3.3 3.7 4.5 3.5 2.8 2.3 2.6 2.9 2.4 2.6 3.1 4.4 3.1 2.8
RAW8/16/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.9 5.7 8.3 6.6 6.9 7.2 6.9 6.2 7.1 6.6 6.6
NITRO8/16/993.5 3.5 4.0 4.2 2.8 3.3 2.5 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.7 4.3 3.3 3.0
RAW8/23/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.4 5.7 5.6 5.9 6.0 6.4 5.5 5.2 6.4 5.7 5.7
NITRO8/23/992.9 3.5 3.3 3.5 2.7 2.5 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.8 3.4 2.3 2.9 2.8
RAW
11 PM
8/30/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.8 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.5 4.2 4.0 3.7 4.2 4.2 N/A
NITRO8/30/992.7 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.5 4.2 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.8 4.4 4.0 N/A
RAW
11 PM
9/6/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.9 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.4 N/A
NITRO9/6/993.5 3.7 3.7 4.2 4.5 3.9 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.1 N/A
RAW9/13/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.2 5.9 5.9 5.9 6.4 6.2 6.0 5.8 7.0 6.0 6.0
NITRO9/13/993.3 4.1 4.6 4.4 2.9 2.7 3.1 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.6 3.4 3.0 3.3 2.9
RAW9/20/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.4 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.7 5.8 5.7 6.2 7.1 6.1 6.1
NITRO9/20/993.5 4.0 4.6 4.3 3.6 2.5 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.0 1.7 3.1 2.6
RAW9/27/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.0 6.7 6.6 6.9 8.3 6.8 6.6 6.1 7.0 6.8 6.8
NITRO9/27/993.6 4.0 4.2 4.7 2.9 2.2 2.2 2.4 1.6 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.8 3.0 2.5
RAW10/4/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.2 5.6 6.1 6.7 5.9 6.1 5.8 5.7 6.5 5.9 5.9
NITRO10/4/993.0 3.6 3.6 4.3 2.9 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.5
RAW10/11/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.3 5.9 5.9 6.2 5.9 6.1 6.7 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1
NITRO10/11/993.1 3.5 3.8 4.2 2.1 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.6 2.1
RAW10/18/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.4 5.8 5.1 5.9 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.4 5.4
NITRO10/18/993.4 3.7 4.1 3.9 3.1 2.7 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.0 2.8 2.7 3.2 3.3 3.1
RAW10/25/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.2 5.2 5.4 6.3 6.0 5.6 5.1 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.6
NITRO10/25/993.5 4.0 4.1 4.4 3.5 3.6 3.5 2.7 3.0 2.5 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.2
RAW11/1/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.6 6.1 6.2 5.6 6.0 5.9 5.5 5.8 6.5 5.9 5.9
NITRO11/1/993.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.2 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.0 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.5 3.2 2.9
RAW11/8/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.4 5.3 4.9 5.0 6.1 5.2 5.7 5.0 6.7 5.4 5.4
NITRO11/8/993.5 3.9 4.5 4.1 3.2 2.9 3.2 3.0 2.4 3.0 2.6 3.3 N/A 3.3 3.0
RAW11/15/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.9 6.3 6.7 6.1 6.4 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.4 6.2 6.2
NITRO11/15/992.8 3.3 3.7 3.8 3.3 2.8 2.8 3.2 2.8 2.8 2.7 3.0 2.8 3.1 2.9
RAW11/22/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.8 5.9 5.4 5.9 5.6 5.9 5.7 5.2 4.7 5.5 5.5
NITRO11/22/993.3 3.6 4.0 3.9 3.5 2.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.4 4.0 3.4 3.3
RAW11/29/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.2 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.9 6.5 6.8 6.3 7.3 6.5 6.5
NITRO11/29/993.4 3.7 4.0 4.1 2.7 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.6 3.0 2.7 3.1 2.8
RAW12/6/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.3 5.7 5.4 5.9 7.2 6.6 6.0 5.8 5.7 6.0 6.0
NITRO12/6/993.1 3.8 4.1 4.1 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.6 2.0 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.7 3.0 2.7
RAW12/13/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.6 5.8 6.5 6.6 6.4 6.0 5.9 6.0 5.8 6.1 6.1
NITRO12/13/992.9 3.4 3.9 4.0 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.7 3.3 2.8 2.5
RAW12/20/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.7 5.7 6.4 5.5 6.1 6.4 6.2 5.6 6.1 5.8 5.8
NITRO12/20/993.7 4.0 3.9 4.1 3.5 2.6 2.4 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.7 3.0 3.6 3.2 2.9
RAW12/27/99N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.7 5.5 5.4 5.6 6.5 6.1 5.7 6.0 6.6 5.8 5.8
NITRO12/27/993.0 3.6 3.8 4.3 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.0 3.0 N/A 2.9 2.5


 RAW   Q5   Q6   Q7   Q8   Q9   Q10   Q11   Q12   OR   Total
 AVG    5.6     6.0     6.2     6.1     6.4      6.2      6.2      6.2     6.6           6.2
 Q1    5.8     6.0     6.2     5.7     6.0      5.8      5.9      6.0     6.2           5.9
 Q2    5.7     6.2     6.5     6.5     6.8      6.8      6.6      6.7     7.3           6.7
 Q3    5.4     6.0     6.5     6.3     6.7      6.4      6.3      6.2     6.9           6.3
 Q4    5.5     5.8     5.8     6.0     6.2      6.0      5.9      5.8     6.1           5.9


INDEX  Q5   Q6   Q7   Q8   Q9   Q10   Q11   Q12   OR   Total
 AVG      90      97    101      99    103     101       99       99    107          100
 Q1      98    101    104      96    101       98       99     100    105          100
 Q2      84      92      97      97    101     101       99     100    108          100
 Q3      86      96    104    100    108     102     100       99    111          100
 Q4      94      99      99    102    105     102     100       98    104          100